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ABSTRACT
International Relations Theories have undergone an important transformation in 
recent past. Third discipline defining debate and the end of the Cold War have 
provided the space to pursue various approaches in IR. Constructivism emerged 
within this space. It challenged materialist and rationalist premises of mainstream IR 
theories. Constructivism basically made use of identity and culture in foreign policy 
analysis and security studies. It contends that state identities and strategic cultures are 
important factors to shape states’ foreign and security policies. Alliances and security 
dilemmas are then conceptualized as social constructions with a view to identity and 
culture. Turkish-Israeli and Turkish-Greek relations are analyzed in this light and 
concluded that the Turkish-Isreali alliance and the security dilemma in Turkish-Greek 
relations have important identity questions and strategic cultural factors.
IV
ÖZET
Uluslararası İlişkiler kuramları yakın geçmişte çok önemli bir dönüşüm geçirdi. 
Disiplini tanımlayan ‘üçünçü tartışma’ ve Soğuk Savaşın sona ermesi çok değişik 
yaklaşımların izlenebileceği bir alan sağladı. Konstrüktivizm işte bu ortamda ortaya 
çıktı. O geleneksel Uluslararası İlişkiler kuramlarının mateıyalist ve rasyonalist 
temellerini hedef aldı. Konstrüktivism dış politika analizinde ve güvenlik 
çalışmalarında kimlik ve kültür konularından faydalandı. O devletlerin kimliklerinin 
ve stratejik kültürlerinin onların dış ve güvenlik politikalarını belirleyen önemli 
unsurlar olduğunu iddia eder. İttifaklar ve güvenlik ikilemleri kimlik ve kültüre atıfla 
sosyal kurgular olarak kavramsallaştırılır. Türk-İsrail ve Türk-Yunan ilişkileri bu 
açıdan incelenerek, Türk-İsrail ittifakında ve Türk-Yunan ilişkilerindeki güvenlik 
ikileminde önemli kimlik sorunlarının ve stratejik kültürel unsurların var olduğu 
sonucu çıkartılır.
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INTRODUCTION
The contours of IR Theory in recent years have been broadened. The mainstream 
theories of IR have been seriously challenged by critical approaches. This is because 
they attacked the underlying ontological, epistemological and methodological 
foundations of conventional approaches in IR Theory. Constructivism emerged as an 
analytical framework in this regard but it challenged mainstream IR theory largely on 
ontological grounds. To constructivism, it is the ontology that basically determines 
epistemology and methodology. Constructivism questioned a priori assumptions of 
conventional approaches, asked novel questions and addressed new and neglected 
issues in international relations. Unlike many of critical theories, constructivism 
presented its analytical utility with numerous empirical works as well. This thesis is 
about constructivism and organized as follows.
The first chapter outlines an external-contextual and an internal-discursive 
historiography for IR Theory. Then, it argues that the third debate in discursive terms 
and the end of Cold War in contextual terms has opened up analytical space to 
pursue various approaches. Constructivism emerged within this space.
The second chapter takes up constructivism. In this chapter, fii’st, the term 
constructivism and its nature are defined. Then, its origins, basic assumptions, meta- 
theoretical commitments, methodology and modes of reasoning are outlined. The 
variants of constructivism are also explored. Finally, a constructivist foreign policy 
analysis with a view to identity and culture is established.
The third chapter analyzes how identity and culture is operationalized by 
constructivism. The social identity of any state and its strategic culture are presumed 
to shape its foreign and security policies. As security systems are socially 
constructed, alliances and security dilemmas are reconceptualized as social 
constructions.
The fourth chapter takes up these insights to analyze Turkish-Greek and Turkish- 
Israeli relations particularly in the post-Cold War era. It explores to what extent 
Turkey’s social identity and strategic culture shaped its foreign and security policies 
towards Greece and Israel. It is hypothesized that the alliance between Turkey and 
Israel and the security dilemma between Turkey and Greece are socially constructed 
with a view to identity and strategic culture.
This thesis intends to demonstrate the utility of constructivism in foreign and security 
policies by addressing identity and culture in international relations. Social identity 
of states and their strategic cultures ai'e hypothesized as important drives in the 
formulation and execution of foreign and security policies. It is contended that 
alliances and security dilemmas are reconceptualized in constructivist terms as social 
constructs.
CHAPTER 1:
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HISTORIOGRAPHY
1.1. DISCIPLINARY HISTORIOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The intellectual endeavour to contemplate on the contemporary identity of any 
academic discipline propels one to engage in understanding its origins and the 
environment in which it evolved. International Relations (IR) is not exempt from 
this. To understand better IR theory’s stature after the Cold War', it is necessary to 
evaluate its intellectual origins. The disciplinary history of academic International 
Relations is, however, confounded with historiographical problems (Schmidt, 1994).
Brian Schmidt (1994: 349-67) argues that many of these problems emerge out of 
presentism—the tendencies to (ab)use history for (de)legitimating a theoretical 
tradition while excluding and marginalizing others, to represent the discipline in a 
way to justify certain political projects and to make it exclusive to somewhere, some 
people, some issues and for some purposes—and out of Whig interpretation of 
history—the tendency to measure the past on the standards of the present.
Other problems are, however, methodological. The fundamental confusion between 
the historical and analytical traditions in IR obscures the origins and the development 
of the field. While the former is defined as a “self constituted pattern of conventional 
practice,” the latter refers to “an inherited pattern of thought or a sustained 
intellectual connection through time along which scholars stipulate certain concepts, 
themes and texts functionally similar (Knutsen, 1997: 11-12).” Second, the very 
inadequacies of the external-contextual approach in writing the disciplinary history
of IR, and the problems associated with this kind of writing reinforces the desire of 
critical scholars to find alternative approaches to demonstrate how we got there. 
Schmidt (1994), for example, offers an alternative approach that he labels ‘critical 
internal discursive history’.
External contextual history is based on a simple ‘events driven approach’ that 
constructs the field of IR theory in response to the conjunctural realities of time and 
space. Quite apparently, theories of International Relations are seen as merely the 
conceptual reflections of events ‘out there.’ Contrary to such conventional histories 
of the discipline, the internal discursive narrative is rather critical of what we have 
known as IR. It also rewrites the historiography of IR through an excursion into 
scholarly discourse, the artifacts of which appear as journal ai'ticles, manuscripts, 
biographies and texts. Therefore, it holds that “there is no mirror of history for IR 
theorists to look into. Rather we are the history and the object of academic history is 
discourse all the way down (Dunne, 1998; 350).”
Ole Waever (1998: 691-694) argues that IR history is written ‘without any 
theoretical framework whatsoever’ and the historiographical debate is away in our 
field. Therefore, he (1998: 687-727) applies a three-layered comprehensive sociology 
of science approach to the history of IR theory covering not only institutional and 
political constellations, but also the intellectual environment.
Internal-discursive history is important because it shows the conceptual contributions 
of scholars to intellectual debates. Discursive history deals with conceptu?.'.
. 4
innovations and developments that are not exogenously given or simply existing in 
nature, but fall exclusively into the domain of scholars.
Historical, descriptive, and external-contextual approaches are voluminous. We now 
need to pay more attention to the other side of the coin. Critical internal-discursive 
history supplements and corrects those accounts and enables us to comprehend more 
clearly the intellectual contours in IR theory.
1.1.1. EXTERNAL-CONTEXTUAL HISTORY
The close connection between theory and events is undeniable. External 
developments are presumed to engender internal theoretical implications. External- 
contextual history can appear in a variety of forms: chronological-descriptive, socio­
political and institutional, or in the study of the various IR theoretical traditions.
Chronological-descriptive IR history is very evident with some conventional 
explanations going back to antiquity in order to find out the origins of the discipline 
(Parkinson, 1977; Olson and Groom, 1991; Gilpin, 1986; Bull, 1977). In this sense, 
Thucydides’ The History of the' Peloponnesian War is frequently mentioned as the 
first authoritative text that outlines the basics of balance of power theory which 
forms the backbone of the realist tradition (Knutsen, 1997).* Consequently, 
understanding the history of IR stretching back to the ancient times is considered as 
imperative to understand the origins of the IR discipline.
‘ Knutsen makes theoretical inferences from thinkers by going back to pre-modem times.
IR emerged as a separate discipline in the conventional understanding in the 
aftermath of the First World War. As a practical matter, “it grew out of a fervent 
desire to understand and therefore to find ways to control world politics in order to 
prevent future wars (Olson and Onuf, 1985: 12).” In line with this argument in 
contextual terms, Steve Smith (1987: 192) argues that “International Relations 
developed as a response to events in the real world and defined its purpose as 
preventing their repetition.” The legacy of the war profoundly affected both policy 
makers and academics. Accordingly, scholars gave much emphasis to the study of 
international law and international organizations and thus “the subject that studied 
such phenomena took on a strongly normative, prescriptive character”, referred as 
the period of idealism (Smith, 1987).
The modern twentieth century history of IR is written in such a way that the 
prevailing theoretical approaches to the study of international relations have been 
shaped exclusively by the international environment and reflect the peculiar features 
of context where they operate. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith (1990: chp. 2) advance 
the history of IR theory with distinct phases in which certain schools of thought, 
approaches or tendencies to the .study of international relations have displayed near 
dominance. Following the inception of discipline with Idealism, Realism in mid 
1930’s and 1940’s, methodological Behavioralism in mid 1950’s and 1960’s, 
Transnationalism and Interdependence in 1970’s and Neo-realism in late 1970’s and 
1980’s have become the dominant approaches. The era of the 1990’s observes three 
distinctive paradigms operating simultaneously: Realism, Pluralism (Liberalism) and 
Globalism (Structuralism). Likewise, William Olson and Nicholas Onuf (1985: 6-11) 
focus on five overlapping phases: the historical one precipitated by the First World
War which was dominated by historical and legalistic approaches; the institutional 
phase of the interwar period represented by the League of Nations; then another 
institutional era as embodied by the UN which was, however, overshadowed by the 
geopolitical and ideological Cold War—whose main theoretical approach was 
realism; finally, the ‘sanitized realism’ of Kenneth Waltz and other structural realists.
K.J. Holsti (1998: 17), in his work on IR scholarship during the Cold War, makes it 
explicit that “a field of study necessarily reflects or takes on a coloration of actual 
social conditions.” His review (1998: 46), therefore, follows a contextual line based 
on the Cold War’s peculiar environment despite his acknowledgment that “while 
context matters,... it is not a sufficient explanation for the development of the field.” 
He argues that distinct features of the period were its external strategic or normative 
concerns that first contributed to the conceptualization of international politics at the 
system level, then gave rise to the development of strategic studies, security studies, 
conflict resolution and defense studies. A phenomenological turn in foreign policy 
analysis evolved in order to avoid failures in foreign policies in an era of nuclear· 
weapons, and the development of decision making studies was precipitated the 
Cuban Missile crisis of October 1962. The European Coal and Steel Community and 
later the European Economic Community provided the impetus for numerous studies 
on integration and this research agenda for cooperation later evolved under the rubric 
of interdependence, neo-liberal institutionalism, international regimes and learning 
thi-ough epistemic communities and cognitive approaches. In by all means contextual 
terms, “The areas of crisis-decision making, bargaining theory and deterrence, and 
security studies in general demonstrated most explicitly the nexus between the Cold 
war and scholarship (Holsti, 1998: 44).”
Some other histories of IR heavily emphasize the role of intellectual, socio-political, 
and institutional factors in the development of the field of IR theory. Stanley 
Hoffman (1977: 41-60) in this regard ai'ticulates well how IR emerged as ‘an 
American social science’. Three factors, ‘intellectual predispositions, political 
circumstances and institutional opportunities’ have determined the nature and the 
character of the study of IR. As for the institutional factors, Olson and Onuf (1985: 
7-8) argue that
Rapid expansion of the universities, the success of the German ideal 
of doctoral training...and the willingness of US elites to accept, even 
to relish, the responsibilities of being the world’s greatest power... ail 
these factors contributed to the rapid growth of International Relations 
and to its institutionalization during the 1950s and 1960s.
Ekkehard Krippendorf (1987: 207-214) also argues that the emergence of IR as an
offspring of Political Science by government initiative in a certain political culture of
America made the discipline power and policy relevant, and government oriented.
Accordingly, Smith (1987: 203) blatantly articulates that
International Relations has indeed developed as a US social science. 
Only in the US has there been the combination of an intellectual 
predisposition towards social science, a system of policy communities 
that takes people back and forth from the academic and political 
worlds, and a political climate that was looking for guidelines for 
managing international events. This combination was crucial for the 
success of Realism, and since 1945 the policy concerns of the US 
have dominated the direction of the discipline.
Miles Kahler (1993: 395-412) argues that the Second World War did not produce 
similar interest in Europe as in the US for the study of IR. The weak institutional 
nexus of IR studies, the declining international position of Europe, the limited 
amount of foundation support, the slow expansion of universities and the rigid 
structure of their systems led Europe to fall behind the US in the development of IP,
in the postwar period. Further, in explaining the theoretical backwardness of Europe, 
Kahler (1993: 403) puts forward a contextual explanation that Europe since the 
Second World War has been enjoying a its longest peaceful period, something that is 
hardly conducive for theoretical innovation.
Another type of contextual history is evident in the study of traditions. The taxonomy 
of traditions presented by Timothy Dunne (1993; 305-318) is the widespread 
approach to the IR theory and thus to the history of IR in general. Traditions as 
paradigms and methods implying an explicit sense of continuity seem to offer more 
analytical history of the discipline with a historical focus. Paul Viotti and Mark 
Kauppi (1993) enclose all theoretical renderings within thi'ee distinctive paradigms 
with far reaching historical and philosophical settings and intellectual precursors. 
This approach indeed gets its inspiration from Martin Wight’s three ‘R’s; Realism, 
Rationalism, and Revolutionism with a blend of Kuhn’s notion of paradigm (Wight 
and Porter, 1991).
The confluence of historic and analytic tradition confuses us as to when IR emerged 
as a distinct discipline, and the institutional and socio-political factors make the 
discipline exclusively an American field of interest legitimizing its hegemony. The 
history as tradition approach is also problematic since it by its nature mythologizes 
existing traditions and consequently the traditions determine the boundaries to 
conduct research, the questions to ask, and the way to think.
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1.1.2. INTERNAL-DISCURSIVE HISTORY
Internal discursive history aims to recover the past with a critical investigation into
the scholarly texts, conversations, and debates within the discipline. While
acknowledging the profound theoretical implications of exogenous events, it
challenges the orthodox history by reconstruing the intellectual developments within
the discursive domain of the IR discipline. As formulated by Schmidt (1998a: 439),
The task of an internal history is to describe the evolution of 
conceptual forms the discipline has taken by examining the discursive 
practices that have led to the different historical configurations ... the 
subject matter is discourse-as embodied in scholarly journal articles, 
professional conference papers, manuscripts, textbooks, and other 
sources that record the literal conversation of the discipline.
Following such a path, contrary to conventional history that represents the interwar 
period as the age of idealism, Schmidt (1998a: 434; see also Kahler, 1998) contends 
that “the interwar period can not be construed as idealistic and that the fundamental 
distinction between idealist and realist periods in the history of the field is a 
misrepresentation.” When American Political Science Association (APSA) was 
established in 1903, the most influential paradigm for the study of political science^ 
was ‘juristic theory of the state’. Its basic assumptions, such as, the sovereign 
attribute of the state, anarchy problématique in the international realm and the 
pessimistic view of international law promoted the development of realism. On the 
other hand, this view was challenged by the pluralists who disaggregate the state into 
its many constituent parts and thus they refuted the essential unity and absoluteness
Schmidt unconventionally dates back the origin of IR as a discipline to the formation of APSA 
(American Political Science Association) in 1903 see Schmidt, Brian C. 1998. “Lessons From the 
Past: Reassessing the Disciplinary History of International Relations,” International Studies Quarterly 
42: 439. For a critical internal-discursive history of IR for the interwar period, see Schmidt, Brian C. 
1998. The Political Discourses of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations Albany: 
State University of New York Press.
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of the state and sovereignty, neither indivisible, unlimited, nor supreme. Pluralism in 
fact was not just an alternative conception of the state but also a normative theory of 
politics. However, the preoccupation of interwar scholars with international 
organization and international law, contrary to the conventional presumption of 
idealism or utopianism was an “explicit attempt to reform the international anarchy 
(Schmidt, 1998a; 449).” As such, a rigorous re-reading of the works of the so-called 
Idealists reveals that they “were familiar with the type of thinking that later came to 
be called Realist” and flirthermore they were in an “ongoing, explicit or implicit 
dialogue with the position later labelled Realist (Osiander, 1998: 409, 415).” Realist 
paradigm, therefore, “was a widely held one well [even] before World War I 
(Osiander, 1998: 415).”
Once more in orthodoxy. World War II led to realist premises coming to the 
forefront of the agenda of IR scholai's. Critical assessment, however, reveals that this 
period can not be construed as mere realpolitik. As recent studies in international 
political economy have uncovered, the institutional arrangements in international 
economic relations in the post-war period were multilateral. In many ways, 
multilateralism contradicts the very axioms of power politics. The establishment of 
GATT, World Bank, IBRD and other institutions have been not exclusively on realist 
premises, nor have relative gains predominated. In brief, multilateralism as an 
institution in its broadest sense conveys the message that the post-war international 
order was constructed in line with the principles of indivisibility, generalized norms 
that are binding upon their members and diffuse reciprocity that is encapsulated as 
‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie, 1992).
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As for the recent past of IR theory, conventional history can hardly account for the 
rise of ‘critical thinking’ unless it relates to the broader interdisciplinary debate 
within the social sciences as a whole. Just as Jim George (1994: 42) establishes a 
“broad historicophilosophical context within which contemporary IR can be 
understood in discursive terms” so the heightened interest in critical approaches has 
nothing to do with the wordly events in 1980s, as the second Cold War gained 
momentum, but rather actually relates to the discourse within IR that has been 
affected by critical social theory of the general debate across overall social sciences 
and humanities.
Internal-discursive history takes its most extreme forms in the critical approaches of 
the post-positivist debate. These works aim to deconstruct the myths of traditions, the 
epic history of the discipline, and the memorializing reading that conventional 
accounts have produced. As memorializing function. Waltz’s reading of 
Machievalli’s ‘The Prince’ constitutes it a foundation and an origin of the Realist 
tradition, whereas Walker’s reading of the same text can hardly provide any 
foundation or origin of the sort of Realist tradition (Ashley and Walker, 1990: 385- 
86).
1.2. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE END OF THE COLD WAR
The debate over theoretical implications of the end of the Cold War is part and parcel 
of the external-contextual history of IR theory. Taken in this way, it necessarily 
implies a theoretical turn corresponding to worldly events, as the First and Second 
World Wars had displayed such points of departures. The critiques against the
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mainstream theories^ and the theoretical innovations engendered by the end of the 
Cold War- are of a conjunctural nature mostly determined exogenously to the external 
developments. The intellectual ferment in the domain of IR theory to the event is 
appreciated to indicate the weaknesses of existing theoretical approaches, no matter 
how much the critiques are formulated on the basis of ex post facto explanations. In 
facti excellent critiques against neo-realism as the dominant discourse of the 
theoretical field had already been well-established before the end of the Cold War at 
the most abstract levels involving philosophical and meta-theoretical discussions 
(Ashley, 1986; Kratochwill, 1984; Ruggie, 1986). The critics, nevertheless, were 
vilified for lack of empirical evidence supporting theii· arguments. In such a context, 
the peaceful end of the Cold War provided seemingly the appropriate context in 
which alternative theories as opposed to conventional ones could present powerful 
explanations with empirical support.
The theoretical implications of the end of the Cold War may be summarized as such: 
the increasing critics of mainstream approaches of IR on the basis of their predictive 
failure to anticipate the events leading to the end of the Cold War and hence 
questioning their privileged methodologies; the examination of the different 
conceptions of ‘change’ to the events of 1989-91 and thus the critics of particularly 
structural version of realism; the attempts to construct and employ new approaches 
for better accounts of the end of the Cold War; and the increasing reliance on 
domestic and individual level theories, emphasizing ideas, discourse, culture and 
identity-based explanations.
I use the term mainstream to refer basically to neo-realist and neo-liberal theories of realist and 
idealist (liberal) traditions in IR.
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To begin with, the end of the Cold War compelled John Lewis Gaddis (1992/93) to 
question the so-called scientific, systemic, predictive theories of IR and thus argue 
that they should be replaced by less rigorous ones that can be found in humanities. 
Theory is not only a way to describe reality and anticipate the future but also could 
benefit from such methods as “narrative, analogy, paradox, irony, intuition, 
imagination, and -not least in importance-style (Gaddis, 1992/93: 58).” Gaddis 
(1992/93:53) puts forth as a “methodological passing of ships in the night” to portray 
the methodological problems of the scientific approaches in IR to generate theories 
of international politics.
Secondly, another kind of implication revolves around on the concept of change and 
necessarily involves the critics of neo-realism. The issue of change or transformation 
centered the theoretical and conceptual discussions, therefore theories better 
equipped to deal with the notion of change have come to forefront on the theoretical 
agenda (Czempiel and Rosenau, 1989; Schölte, 1993: 3-21). Neo-realism as a theory 
of statism, structural materialism, and politicism ascribes change as ‘exclusively an 
attribute of the actors rather than the international system’ and hence neglects 
‘altogether the role of systemic rules and processes of interaction’ in the 
transformation of the international system (Katzenstein, 1989: 295). It, therefore, 
(Katzenstein, 1989: 291) ‘emphasizes not change but continuity’ and ‘predicts 
balancing.’ Since the end of the Cold War constitutes an important point of 
discontinuity and/or transformation in the international system, “the changes of 1989 
present a crucial test case for neo-realism and its systemic approach to international 
politics (Koslowski and Kratochwill, 1994: 215).” Criticisms are levelled against 
neo-realism for its lack of a ‘conceptual apparatus’ to elucidate the great
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transformation not to mention its predictive ·deficit (Kratochwill, 1993; 63). Neo­
realism is criticized in two ways. The first addresses the problem of change. Contrary 
to the presumption of structural (bipolar in this case) persistence (Waltz, 1993),'* the 
Soviet Bloc disintegrated and furthermore the change in question did not occur in the 
way neo-realists had expected via hegemonic or system wide war or changing 
alliances or a redistribution of capabilities at the expense of Soviet Union. The 
second concerns the foreign policy practices of the great powers that can hardly be 
explained through hard realist lenses during that crucial period. Unexpectedly, not 
only Gorbachev pursued concessionary and conciliatory foreign policies but those 
policies also found similar echoes in the Western camp as accommodative strategies 
and responses seeking to temper the revolutionary character of the systemic 
transformation and its substantive implications on the interstate structure of the 
superpower relationship. The theoretical inference is the declining faith in the 
structural version of the dominant realist tradition in the scholarly community a la 
Kuhn. As such, it is argued that “the development of an alternative theoretical 
framework becomes necessary (Koslowski and Kratochwill, 1994: 216).”
Another kind of implication suggests complementary rather than alternative 
explanations to the mainstream IR approaches. It is argued that all versions of realist, 
liberal and unit level theories can not fully account for the enormous changes “since 
the ‘end of the Cold War’ encompasses an entire class of events which are almost 
impossible to capture by a single theory (Grunberg and Risse-Kappen, 1992: 143).” 
Therefore, Thomas Risse-Kappen (1994:123) argues that “structural theories of IR
For Waltz, bipolarity endures but in altered state. The.structure of the international politics continues 
to be anarchic despite constant changes. Balance of power is a recurring phenomenon rather than a 
particular and ephemeral condition. See Waltz, Kenneth N. 1993, ‘The Emerging Structure of 
International Politics,” International Security 18(2): 44-79.
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need to be complemented by approaches that integrate domestic politics, 
transnational relations, and the role of ideas if we want to understand the recent sea 
change in world politics.” Bureaucratic politics and cognitive psychological accounts 
are favored in place of behavioral decision making analysis as well as rational choice 
and state as unitai'y actor assumptions. Domestic structures in between transnational 
forces and the foreign policy of states, ideas in between structural conditions and the 
definition of actors’ interests and preferences as intervening variables can elucidate 
the complex interactions among all those factors. In sum, such a result would yield 
middle-range theories with more explanatory power and therefore would alter the 
balance among theoretical approaches in favor of them.
A general critique against Realism as a theoretical tradition is its ‘indeterminacy’. 
Richard Ned Lebow (1994: 250) accordingly contends that “the competing 
predictions of realist theories make realism difficult to falsify. Almost any outcome 
can be made consistent with some vai'iant of realist theory.” Even a leading realist, 
William Wohlforth (1994/95:125, 93), accepts this critique, by pointing out the 
‘indeterminacy of system-level explanations’ and ‘of realist predictions about state 
behavior’ and noting that realist theories ‘are too easy to confirm and too hard to 
falsify’. His explanation of the end of the Cold War by having recourse an 
amalgamation of classical realism, hegemonic rivaky, and power transition is an 
attempt to demonstrate the relevance of realism to the post-Cold War world and to 
make the point that “Realist theories are not invalidated by the post-1989 
transformation of world politics. Indeed, they explain much of story (Wohlforth, 
1998: 92).” His references (1998: 91-129) to the non-material elements of power, a 
perceptual approach to power assessment, the concept of power as influence; the
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need for domestic level analysis in addition to systemic one, and decision-makers’ 
assessment of capabilities seem to be conceptual modifications in realist thought.
The end of Cold War ultimately stimulated methodological debate, discussing 
whether causation (intensive research) or correlation (extensive research), or process 
tracing in its positivist and post-positivist senses respectively matter much in judging 
the diverse theoretical approaches having both contrary and complementary 
explanations. Wohlforth’s (1998) review of the theoretical responses to the end of the 
Cold War shifts the debate over which theoretical approach has the best account of 
the subject matter in question to the search for a reliable standard to evaluate existing 
theories. Since “the events of 1989-91 offer compelling support for all of the 
following; materialist versions of realism and liberalism, as well as agent-, 
institution-, and idea- centered theories”, he (1998: 670, 675) argues that “empirical 
study can not advance the debate.” The main reason is unequivocally 
methodological; the absence of a ‘standard’ for theory appraisal, that is, for assessing 
relative merits of IR theories in response to the major events (Wohlforth, 1998: 651).
The changing material environment of the international system has no doubt sparked 
theoretical discussions, opening, up space for addressing the so-long neglected and 
degraded institutional, cultural, and ideational theories. Ethical issues have raised on 
the global and scholarly agenda, and our established conceptions have been 
challenged (Halliday, 1994). Methodological tools have, at best, been sharpened to 
some extent.
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1.3. THIRD DISCIPLINE DEFINING DEBATE IN INTERNATIONAL. 
RELATIONS
The conventional history of IR signalled the advent of the third debate following the 
initial realist-idealist and the subsequent methodological debate between the 
traditionalists and behavioralists. Herein the third debate can be portrayed in two 
interrelated and overlapping themes: interparadigm debate and post-positivist debate. 
While the former is a discourse over which paradigm is the best representative of the 
international realm, the latter concerns basically meta-theoretical questions.
1.3.1. INTERPARADIGM DEBATE:
ONTOLOGY AND INCOMMENSURABILITY
Influenced from Kuhnian philosophy of science, IR theorists appropriated the notion 
of paradigm—a scholarly community with its distinct approach to the study of 
international relations—and they therefore enclosed all theoretical renderings within 
three distinct paradigmatic perspectives (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993; Wight, 1991; 
Holsti, 1985). The debates from now on are supposed to be not between individual 
scholars or particular theories .but between the analytic frameworks. With their 
distinct research agendas and programs, paradigms have different answers to the 
basic questions of ‘what are causes of war and the conditions of peace, security and 
order’, and what are ‘the essential actors or units of analysis.’ They also hold 
distinctive ‘world images’ (Holsti, 1985: 8). Therefore, the most important actors, 
issues, processes, and outcomes in international politics differ from one paradigm to 
another. Holsti (1985:129) did not see them as conflicting but complementary in that
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“all three paradigms make significant contributions in their own domains. The 
question then is not to choose among them, but to decide which of them is most 
appropriate for organizing teaching and research for particular sets of problems." 
Nevertheless, the problems and the shortcomings accompanied with the 
interparadigm debate left it incapable of opening channels of communication across 
the paradigms and thereafter a meaningful debate. As articulated by Smith (1995: 18- 
21), the arbitrary paradigmatic labels and clear-cut divisions, their ghetto like and 
conservative characteristics, ‘the repressive tolerance’ of Realists in the name of 
theoretical plurality and problems of incommensurability and comparability 
hampered the so-called interparadigm debate.
In fact, the liveliest debate of this period was between neo-realism of Realist 
paradigm and neo-liberal institutionalism of Pluralist paradigm.^ The said debate 
clarified the several points and demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of the two 
most dominant theoretical approaches in IR theory with respect to several issue areas 
in international politics.^
The fundamental reason why the interparadigm debate has fallen short of constituting 
a real challenge to the realist paradigm, as argued by Mark Neufeld (1994), is the fact 
that rival paradigms embrace the' same meta-theoretical commitments. Consequently,
 ^ For a comprehensive critique of neorealism and responses, see Keohane, Robert 0 . (ed.) 1986. 
Neorealism and Its Critics. New York: Columbia University Press.; for a counter reply, see Grieco, 
Joseph M. 1988. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation; A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism,” International Organization 42(3): 485-507.
 ^Three central issues of international politics have been at stake in this debate: The meaning and the 
implications of anarchy, the problem of absolute vs. relative gains and the tension between 
coordination and distribution. For an elucidation of these points and further analysis left off by 
Neorealism and Its Critics, see Baldwin, David. 1993. Neorelism and Neoliberalism: The 
Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press; Powell, Robert. 1994. “Anarchy in 
International Relations: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate,” International Organization 48(2): 313- 
44.
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the repeated efforts to displace realism by having recourse to the different units and 
levels of analysis, dynamics, processes, agendas, issues have hardly produced 
concrete results.
No matter how problematic the interparadigm debate is, however, “scholarship in IR 
is at last emerging from the intellectual cage in which it was imprisoned by post-war 
traditional realism.” This “makes it possible to explore the linkages up and down the 
levels of analysis.” (Banks, 1985: 20)
1.3.2. INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: 
INTERSUBJECTIVE ONTOLOGY AND INTERPRETIVE METHODOLOGY
Beyond the tripartite nature of IR theory, interpretation as a legitimate intellectual 
activity has gained momentum. Interest has increased in interpretive approaches as 
the shortcomings of the positivist methodological unity of science position in the 
social sciences, and in IR in particular, have become blatantly manifest. Even though 
interpretive approaches to international politics are different from traditional, 
positivist ones qualitatively, the former can be used either to supplement or to 
undermine the latter for the simple fact that positivist methodology comprises not 
only ‘strict behavioralism’ but also ‘meaning oriented behavioralism’ which takes 
into account the ‘subjective meanings’, the meanings which human subjects attach to 
behavior (Neufeld, 1993a: 41). Accordingly, such an approach treating subjective 
meanings as intervening variables still complies with positivist-inspired causality.^
For instance, on the causal role of ideas (as subjective meanings) in international politics, see 
particularly Goldstein, Judith and Keohane, Robert O. (eds.) 1993. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs,
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The interpretive approaches start with the understanding that human beings are 
fundamentally self-interpreting and self-defining (Neufeld, 1993a).^ They live in a 
world of cultural meaning, that is a ‘web of meaning’ which is comprised of 
‘intersubjective meanings’. As a consequence, the social world—in contrast to the 
natural world—is itself partly constituted by self-interpretation and self-definition. 
That has led to the epistemological claim that knowledge generating activity is in 
large part an interpretation, a subjective matter as opposed to the positivist claims of 
objectivity. Finally, the attempt to save interpretation from the positivist mode of 
analysis and the search for a match between ontology, epistemology, and 
methodology has raised meta-theoretical concerns (Kratochwill and Ruggie, 1986).
The impulse of interpretive approaches was so immense that a leading mainstream 
theorist of international relations, Robert Keohane (1988), in his presidential address 
to ISA, conceded that how interpretive-critical approaches constituted a counter 
block against mainstream ones. Putting the former as ‘reflective’ and the latter as 
‘rationalistic,’ he confessed that the era of critical thinking has already been under 
way. Hollis and Smith (1990) also clearly outline these two traditions in the history 
of international theory. As they put it, there are always two stories to tell about 
international politics, one is the outsider’s and the other is the insider’s. Positivists 
adhere to the former approach whose goal is to find out causal mechanisms and 
social laws that lead to the development of IR theory. Postpositivists, on the other
Institutions and Political Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
* Contemporary interpretive social science is marked with five distinct traditions: 
phenemenology/ethnomethodology as developed by Husserl and Schütz, the linguistic tradition by 
Wittgenstein and Winch, the hermeneutics tradition by Heidegger and Gadamer, critical theory 
tradition by Marx and Habermas and the tradition of genealogy by Nietzsche and Foucault. In spite of 
their differences, meaning for all of them is ‘intersubjective’ in nature and ‘constitutive’ of social 
reality. The evolution of interpretive social science to more radical interpretive traditions is echoed in 
IR as the advent of post-positivist approaches demonstrates. See, Neufeld, Mark. 1993a, 
“Interpretation and the ‘Science’of International Relations,” Review of International Studies 19:49, in
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hand, follow the latter approach, whose goal is to recover the individual and shared 
meanings that motivated actors to do what they did. While the former depends on 
causal explanation, the latter is concerned with the intention of subjects thi’ough 
methods of interpretation or hermeneutics. Similarly, Robert Cox (1986: 207-10) 
also puts forward twofold approach to the study of IR, one is ‘problem solving’ 
theories, the other is ‘critical’ ones.
1.3.3. POST-POSITIVIST PHILOSOPHY: CRITICAL APPROACHES
Yosef Lapid’s (1989) ‘The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in 
a Post-positivist Era’ among others seems to appear better labelling the Third Debate 
in IR.^ Echoing the second debate’s relation to behavioral methodology, Lapid 
(1989:237) links the third debate both “historically and intellectually, to the 
confluence of diverse anti-positivistic philosophical and sociological trends.’’ The 
triad conceptualization he presents to demonstrate the content of the debate is 
‘paradigmatism’ (concern with meta-scientific units), ‘perspectivism’ (focus on 
thematic premises and assumptions) and ‘relativism’ (methodological pluralism). Of 
these, he argues that perspectivism is the most appropriate way to address the third 
debate. This sentiment has been much voiced in the writings of post-positivist 
approaches which is constituted broadly by Critical Theory and post-structural, post­
modernist, and feminist approaches. Since their core concern is meta-theoretical, 
this new post-positivist historico-philosophical move
note, 30.
’ For the pioneering works in this regard, see Walker, R.B.J. 1988.One World Many Worlds: Struggle: 
For a Just World Peace. Boulder, Colorado: L. Rienner Publisher.; Ashley, Richard. 1984. ‘The 
Poverty of Neorealism,” International Organization 38 (2): 225-86. ; George, Jim and R.B.J., Walker. 
1990. (eds.) ‘The special Issue of International Studies Quarterly.” 30 (2).
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invokes a deliberate shift to the thematic level of underlying 
ontological, epistemological, and axiological premises and 
assumptions... perspectivism in the sense of a strong post-positivist 
focus on thematic premises and assumptions has been internalized as 
a foremost characteristic of the third debate in international relations 
theory. (Lapid, 1989: 241, 243).
Although acknowledging his broad portrayal of the third debate with thematic 
influences from new philosophy and sociology of science, Jim George (1989: 272) 
promptly responded to Lapid by demonstrating the parallel thematic contributions to 
IR (meta)theory from critical social theory. Those are fourfold: the
positivist/empiricist approaches to the study of human society and politics are 
considered inadequate, knowledge constituting processes stress social, historical, and 
cultural themes rather than those of instrumental rationalism or methodological 
individualism, ‘truth as correspondance,’ and the foundationalist search for an 
objective knowledge external to history and social practice is rejected, and reality is 
taken as a linguistic construction.
In fact, the said various post-positivist themes are all interrelated, searching for more 
analytical space to think freely of the way to go beyond the traditional discursive 
boundaries (Ashley and Walker, 1990).
1.3.3.1. Minimal foundationalism vs. Antifoundationalism 
A. Critical Theory: Reasoned Assessment
The critical approaches for their nature are of heterogenous character in their 
strategies of theoretical engagement. No matter how eclectic these approaches are, 
two broad tendencies are discerned: “Critical interpretivism and radical
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interpretivism (Hoffman, 1991: 170).” Respectively, the former represents minimal 
foundationalism and the latter anti-foundationalism in their approaches to IR theory. 
For the former, the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School and, for the latter, post­
modern and post-structural approaches are the best representatives. The contention 
between foundationalism and antifoundationalism is celebrated by Steve Smith 
(1995: 18-21; George, 1994: 185-88) as the most fundamental one for the prospect of 
the entire IR discipline.
In this context, the debate between Hoffman and Rengger over whether the next 
paradigmatic stage in IR is Critical Theory or not exemplifies the paradox of critical 
approaches to foundationalism and universalism. For Rengger (1988: 81-89), the 
paradoxical point is the inherent rationalism as an Enlightenment legacy within 
Critical Theory and thus its commitment to the foundationalism of positivism it 
intends to deconstruct. Hoffman’s response (1988: 92) to this indictment was that, 
“the essence of rationality, in the context of critical theory, entails a limitless 
invitation to criticism. In consequence, a complacent faith in rationalism is ruled 
out.” This is because, Hoffman argues (1988: 92), Critical theorists “retain a concept 
of reason which asserts itself simultaneously against both instrumentalism and 
existentialism, which is exercised in conjunction with normative concerns and which 
is critically applicable to itself.”
B. Postmodernism and Poststructuralism: Antifoundationalist Posture
Post-modernism in terms of its philosophy and epistemology is a challenging view to 
traditional approaches in that it is neither positivist nor materialist. For post 
modernists, truth is either meaningless or arbitrary, conventional claims to truth and
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knowledge are totalizing discourses, knowledge is relative and subjective. They 
attack foundationalism in every form. They offer a critique of modern reason and 
rationality as the invention of Enlightenment because it indicates the idea of progress 
that post-modernists are all suspicious. Consequently, post-modernism “is not a new 
paradigm but rather an end to all paradigms; they are ‘post-paradigmatic’ (Rosenau, 
1991: 39).”
Postmodernism is interdisciplinary in its approach. Its methodology comprises anti- 
objectivist deconstruction and subjectivist interpretation by having recourse to 
intuition, feelings, insights and instinct. It defines everything as a text, which 
constitutes the centre of its analysis. The approach to reality is multifaceted in the 
post-modern world, it is an absolute intertextuality constructed tlrough the 
interaction between the reader and the text and therefore posing different manifold 
interpretations and consequently precluding causal analysis. The subject is 
abandoned and thus the demarcation between subject and the object is broken down. 
Post-modernists are anti-representational in their conception of reality since 
representation reinforces the dichotomy between subject and the object and holds an 
independent reality apart from the subject (Rosenau, 1990; 1991; George, 1994, esp. 
chp.8). Postmodernism’s philosophy, epistemology and methodology constitute an 
internal logic which is consistent with itself even though it seems absurd for many 
outsiders (Rosenau, 1991).
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1.3.3.2. THE INSIGHTS OF CRITICAL APPROACHES
From a perspective of their authentic contributions to IR rather than whatever 
nuances among them, some points of commonalities or contributions can be 
identified with critical scholarship. In sum, they are concerned with the crisis of 
modernity, articulate the relationship between knowledge and power, emphasize 
normative concerns and locate identity/difference in the study of IR and emphasize 
the social construction of reality.
A. Crisis of modernity
IR theory is located in the grand project of modernity (Devetak, 1995). The 
discursive connection between modernity, social theory and International Relations 
and the interdisciplinary character of IR makes it open to the influences from other 
realms of studies basically in the humanities and social sciences. At the 
(meta)theoretical level, the developments in the philosophy of science and social 
theory resonate in the field of IR theory as well. Consequently, the conviction that 
“International Relations is a discrete area of action and discourse, separate from 
social and political theory” has broken down (Hoffman, 1987: 231). The very 
interdisciplinary character of IR among and within social sciences renders it sensitive 
to any developments in other areas. In this context, Chris Brown (1994: 213) 
contends that “International Relations theory is no longer confined to its own, self- 
imposed, ghetto.”
Unlike earlier challenges to traditional IR theory Brown (1994: 214) argues that 
critical approaches represents not only a disciplinary crisis, but more importantly
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also the ‘crisis of modernity’—‘perhaps the crisis in social and political thought
since the Enlightenment.’ Consequently, they
have in common a scepticism towards traditional social theory with its 
belief that there is a hierarchy of forms of knowledge, and towards the 
meta-naiTative of modernity with its overriding emphasis on technical 
or scientific forms of rationality. (Hoffman, 1991: 169-70).
Critical thinking, broadly represented by Critical Theory and Post-structural 
approaches including post-modernism and feminist themes, is “a larger project which 
is a search for thinking space within the modern categories of unity, identity, and 
homogeneity” to uncover what is left out, marginalised, excluded and to recognize 
the ‘other’ (George and Campbell, 1990: 280).” Thus potmodernism centres its
critiques to
the foundationalism and essentialism of post-Enlightenment scientific 
philosophy, its universalist presuppositions about modern rational 
man, its hidden metaphysics, its metatheoretical commitment to 
dualized categories of meaning and understanding, its logocentric 
strategies of identity and hiérarchisation, its theorized propositions 
about human nature, its dogmatic faith in method, its philosophies of 
intention and consciousness, and its tendency towai'd grand 
theory...(George and Campbell, 1990: 280)
B. Problematizing positivist epistemology: relate knowledge to interests and power
Critical Theory presents the connection between knowledge and power, knowledge 
and interest. Jurgen Habermas articulates the close relationship between knowledge 
and interest, and how knowledge is dependent on some form of interest (technical, 
practical or emancipatory). Technical and practical interest through instrumental 
rationality—an overriding orthodox positivist epistemology—dominated the study of 
IR and reproduced the traditional discourse of IR theory within the narrative of 
modernity. Richard Ashley (1981) introduced Habermas’ triad of knowledge 
generating interests to IR, when he portrayed neoreahsm in technical terms. Later,
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Hoffman (1987) demonstrated how the pai’adigms in contention in IR have always 
lacked a particularly emancipatory interest in their theoretical formulations. Within 
this tradition, Robert Cox (1986: 207) puts much emphasis on the close nexus 
between knowledge and power, the purposive nature of knowledge or theory for 
some political projects by his oft-quoted statement: “Theory is always/or someone
and/or some purpose.' ,10
The problem solving oriented traditional IR theory always performs accordingly in a 
way to reproduce the existing hierarchies, dichotomies, power relations, hegemonies, 
and orthodoxies in the discourse of IR theory. Whereas, Critical Theory questions the 
so-called neutral, objectivist, universal, scientific status attached to the positivist 
epistemology, to knowledge and thereupon to the theories based on such 
epistemology (Cox, 1986: 207-10).
C. Normative concerns
Mervyn Frost (1986; 1994) demonstrates that the ‘positivist bias’ in the study of IR 
naturally brings about the ‘dearth of normative theory’ in the discipline. This is 
because the positivist distinction between is and ought, fact and value denigrates 
normative theorizing. Critical approaches stress the interpretive and thus value-laden 
nature of all propositions.
The normative concerns of critical approaches are to deconstruct, and thus to liberate 
human consciousness from, the totalizing, hegemonic discourses and the logocentrics 
emanated from within the Western culture. Postmodernism intends to de/construct
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how realism has constructed ethics and IR in such narrow and restricted terms and at 
the same time indicates how it might be possible to think and behave ethically 
beyond the ‘egoism/anarchy thematic’ (George, 1995: 195-223). However, Roger 
Spegele (1995: 211-36) argues that the epistemological relativism of post-modern 
intertextuality and the gender relativism of feminist standpoint theory lead to ‘moral 
nihilism’ and thus make their ethical considerations dubious, and limited. Thus a 
‘morality of liberation’ turns into a ‘liberation from morality’ (Spegele, 1995: 214).
D. Recognition of Identity/Difference
Since the positivist underpinnings of mainstream approaches make it difficult to 
theorize about the construction of identities—whether gender, racial, ethnic, 
religious- in international politics (Zalewski and Enloe, 1995), the issue of 
identity/difference has been raised by critical approaches. They clearly demonstrated 
that modernity is operating on ethno-, logo-, sovereign-, state- centric, and 
exclusionary discursive practices. They reproduce and in turn are re-produced by 
such cartezian dichotomies of identity/difference, west/east, modern/ancient, 
occidental/oriental, and self/other.
E. Social Construction of Reality
The social construction of reality is an important dimension for all critical 
approaches. All of these approaches are sceptical that there is an external, 
independent of the subject, crude reality ‘out there’ to be discovered. Contrary to 
that, it is not a thing given, but a thing made.
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Poststructuralists, postmodernists and postmodern feminists hold an extreme 
subjectivity of reality seeing it as merely one of intertextual discourse. For Critical 
theory, reality is a combination of both material and discursive elements, for 
constructivism it emerges as a result of a mutual interaction between these forces 
following the structuration theory of Giddens. Constructivism does give neither the 
material nor the subjective factors the priority but to the interaction (Onuf, 1989: 40). 
Critical scholarship holds that how we—as scholars—think and talk about 
international politics is to a considerable extent constitutive of what the nature of 
international relations is or would be. Therefore, international politics is a form of 
social construction.
1.3.4. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE THIRD DEBATE
As Jim George and David Campbell (1990: 281) points out, the third debate has had
two influential impacts on the academic discipline of IR:
First, it is no longer possible to innocently maintain the objectivity of 
one’s scholarship by recourse to the ‘facts’ or ‘the real world’. 
Second, a space has been created for the pursuit of research strategies 
with meta-theoretical commitments that might have been pejoratively 
labelled ‘subjectivist’ or ‘idealist’. Within this space many 
alternatives could be pursued.
Beyond this, while interparadigm contention provided the space for analytic 
frameworks other than realism, post-positivist philosophy rendered the mainstream 
theories of IR problematic by attacking their thematic or meta-theoretical premises 
and assumptions concerning their methodology, epistemology and ontology. As aptly 
put by John Vasquez (1995: 239),
While the third debate has placed the scientific study of world politics 
in a position where it must reconstruct its philosophical foundation.
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this need not necessarily jeopardize its reseai'ch approaches ... 
Nevertheless, the [post-modernist] critique has ended much of myopia 
associated with logical positivism and created a more congenial space 
for normative and legal approaches as well as theory construction in 
general.
1.4. THE EMERGENCE OF CONSTRUCTIVISM
The end result of these various debates in IR theory as Holsti (1993: 401) notes is 
that “fragmentation and pluralism are the essential characteristics of theoretical 
enterprise today...[c]ompared to just twenty years ago, there is a greatly expanded 
[and expanding] menu of theoretical offerings.” The interparadigm debate opened an 
intellectual space to explore and analyze international relations through different 
viewpoints and normative concerns and at different levels of analyses other than the 
realist paradigm postulated. Post-positivist philosophy has brought metatheoretical 
insights, particularly an enhanced ‘reflexivity’ to IR (Neufeld, 1993b). What is 
common to all these propositions is that the subjective, normative side of the 
world—neglected for too long—needs to be emphasized in order to balance the 
materialist and objectivist foundations of the mainstream approaches.
In such juncture, the extreme sides whether materialist or subjective, agential or 
structural ontology, causal or interpretive methodology (causation or constitution), or 
foundational-explanatory or antifoundational-interpretive epistemology in 
aforementioned debates necessarily emerged. The ones who dissatisfied with both 
extreme positioning chose another path, constructivism. Since it stands for the 
middle ground, aiming to overcome the duality or dichotomy in all three ontological, 
epistemological and methodological debates.
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CHAPTER 2: CONSTRUCTIVISM IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS THEORY
2.1. WHAT IS CONSTRUCTIVISM:
THE NATURE AND DEFINITION OF CONSTRUCTIVISM
Although constructivism is a widely used term in IR, Emanuel Adler (1997: 320) 
points out that “there is very little clarity and even less consensus as to its nature and 
substance.” Nicholas Onuf (1989) initially introduced constructivism to IR. For him 
(1989: 36), it meant “people and societies construct, or constitute, each other” in 
simplest terms. Discussing the subject at the philosophical level, he locates it against 
the empiricist and realist assumptions of working science. The constructivism Onuf 
(1989: 40) prefers “does not draw a sharp distinction between material and social 
realities- the material and the social contaminate each other, but variably—and it 
does not grant sovereignty to either the material or the social by defining the other 
out of existence.”
Emanuel Adler (1997: 322) defines constructivism as “the view that the manner in
which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction
depends on a dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material
world.” Such a definition stands somewhere in a continuum between material and
ideational, agential and structural extreme points. As Adler (1997: 330) elaborates.
Constructivism seizes the middle ground because it is interested in 
understanding how the material, subjective and intersubjective worlds 
interact in the construction of reality, and because, rather than 
focusing exclusively on how structures constitute agent’s identities 
and interests, it also seeks to explain how individual agents socially 
construct these structures in the first place.
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Constructivism indeed can be understood in both its narrowest and broadest senses. 
The former takes it as just a methodology (Checkel: 1998: 325) and the latter sees it 
in generic term encompassing all critical approaches (Mearsheimer, 1994-95). 
However, as the critical literature has broadened, constructivism became the label for 
a particular approach distinct in itself. It has become a research program with 
various kinds of empirical works. Though it has not developed a theory of its own— 
like balance of power—it offers conceptual frames to theorize some of the real issues 
in international politics.
Constructivism emerged as an approach to break the stalemate that the neorealist and 
neoliberal debate resulted in. Its critiques of these two dominant theoretical traditions 
focus on what they take for granted or ignore. Constructivism studies the sources and 
the content of state interests and preferences which are postulated, and it emphasizes 
the ideational and social side of international politics which is ignored by neorealism 
and neoliberalism. In order to grasp better what constructivism is in IR we should 
investigate its origins.
2.2. THE ORIGINS
John Ruggie (1998: 856) finds the initial roots of constructivism in ‘the sociology of 
Emile Durkheim and Max Weber’ resisting the ascending tide of ‘utilitarianism and 
methodological individualism’ to which neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist 
theories of IR are indebted as their origins and sources in the late nineteenth century. 
He (1998: 862) also cites ‘neo-functionalism’ and the ‘English School’ as would be 
antecedents of contemporary constructivism in IR theory. Yet the major drive of
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constructivism to come out as a research program was the countermove to ‘neo- 
utilitai-ianism,’ by the dominant schools of thought in IR, namely neorealism and 
neoliberalism. Neo-utilitarianism is grounded on an epistemology and ontology that 
limits its own scope to address some issues of international relations and takes for 
granted others. As such, “Constructivism addresses many of the same issues that 
neo-utilitarianism has addressed, though typically from a different angle. But it also 
concerns itself with issues that neo-utilitarianism treats by assumption, discounts, 
ignores, or simply can not apprehend within its ontology and/or epistemology 
(Ruggie, 1998: 878).” Therefore, the discrepancies seems to appear between 
constructivist and neo-utilitarian ideational research programs not in the domain of 
empirical issues but at a more fundamental, even philosophical, level (Ruggie, 1998: 
869).
Constructivism can also trace its origins to the ‘English School’ of IR which has 
never been affiliated with positivism and which dealt with international institutional 
structures such as diplomacy, international law, balance of power and international 
society. Constructivism as such conceptualizes ‘sovereignty’ in social/intersubjective 
terms. As Timothy Dunne (1995: 379) argues, “the sovereign state is the constitutive 
community of international sociefy, one whose obedience to the norms of the society 
of states both reaffirms the identity of the sovereign state and reconstitutes the 
structure of international society.” In line with Wendt’s (1992) dictum of ‘anarchy is 
what state make of it’, Dunne (1995: 376, 384) suggests that “society is what states 
have made of it” and so that “international society is a social construction”.
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The imminent origins of constructivism can he found within the Third Debate. As a 
‘metatheoretical project’, not a substantive analysis of international relations, the 
Third Debate opened a space at the metatheoretical level to advance a new 
perspective on world politics by undermining both the ‘rationalist/positivist 
hegemony’ and the very foundations of the dominant discourses of IR theory (Price 
and Reus-Smit, 1998; 263). Within that space, constructivism emerged. Price and 
Reus-Smit (1998; 260) observe the intimate relationship between critical approaches 
and constructivism that ‘Though less preoccupied with metatheoretical issues and 
disciplinai'y critique as the core content of their scholarship than Third Debate 
theorists, constructivists work with ontological assumptions, conceptual frameworks 
and methodological approaches that originate in critical social theory.”
Constructivism in fact started to develop initially as a metatheoretical project. The 
agent-structure debate in social theory and scientific realist approach in philosophy 
have shaped the basic assumptions of constructivism.
2.3. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
Keith Krause (1998; 316-17) best summarizes the basics of constructivism;
1) The principle actors in world politics whether states or other agents are socially 
constructed thi’ough both ideational and material resources.
2) The actors and subjects in world politics are constituted and endowed collective 
meanings and identities through practices and representations. The practices can 
be composed of both discursive and non-discursive elements.
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3) World politics is not static and its structures are socially constructed. Change is 
possible but also difficult because these structures are relatively stable.
4) The attainment of objective knowledge of the subjects, structures and practices of 
world politics is difficult because the facts are only grasped through mediation. 
They are collectively mediative facts.
5) The appropriate methodology is interpretivism. The reseai'ch interests are to 
examine how the agents see and understand the world; the subjects, practices and 
how they attach meanings to them.
6) The purpose of theory is neither explanation nor prediction with a view to 
transhistorical or ahistorical generalizadle causal claims but to understand within 
a given time and space framework.
Constructivism as an approach has two core assumptions as explicated by Alexander 
Wendt (1992; 1994; 1996). First, the fundamental structures of international politics 
are social rather than strictly material—a claim that opposes the materialism of 
neoreahsm and second, that these structures shape actor’s identities and interests, not 
just their behaviour—a claim that opposes the rationalism of the neoliberal approach.
These two assumptions have far reaching implications. The first assumption 
emphasizes the importance of the social character of international politics. It goes 
beyond the physical understanding of the world. Material structures and physical 
capabilities are only understood through the social context within which they 
operate. Constructivists argue that it is not capabilities that matter or have self- 
fulfilling meanings. Rather, what matters is capabilities are interpreted and what 
meanings are attached to them. The US, for example, has little concern over Britain’s
36
nuclear power yet fewer capabilities in the hands of North Korea cause great concern 
(Wendt, 1994; Hopf, 1998).
The second assumption criticizes the methodological individualism upon which 
especially the neoliberal approach has been built. The problem is that it reduces one 
unit of analysis—structure—to the other—the agent. In contrast, constructivists focus 
the interaction between agents and structures so that the ontology is one of mutual 
constitution or co-determination. Neither unit of analysis is reduced to the other, nor 
is either taken as ontologically prior to the other. Thus, constructivists question a 
priori and exogenously determined state interests and preferences, seeing them 
instead as endogenous to the interaction between agency and structure.
*
2.4. CONSTRUCTIVISM AND STRUCTURATION ONTOLOGY: 
AGENT-STRUCTURE PROBLEMATIQUE
While the third debate referred to the ‘epistemological turn’ from positivism to 
postpositivism, modernity to postmodernity or to postempiricism, what is at stake in 
the present debate revolving around the question of agency and structure is the ‘role 
of ontology.’ Such ontological tiirn is even seen as an integral project of developing a 
postpositivist discourse in IR. As Jabri and Chan (1996: 107) put it, “The focus of 
inquiry for a critical, postpositivist IR requires a shift away from concern over 
universalist epistemological legitimacy and a move towards understanding the 
ontological underpinnings of international social, political and economic life. ...[A]n 
ontological discourse ... must precede substantive epistemological questions.” 
Alexander Wendt (1998: 115) goes as far as to argue that “What matters for IR is
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ontology, not epistemology.” After the peaceful end of the systemic structure of the 
Cold War, Martin Hollis and Steve Smith (1994: 241) note that that, “Questions 
concerning the nature of agency and the meaning of structure and the relationship 
between them are now more relevant than ever in international relations theory.” The 
agent-structure debate has thus become the core of the ontological project in IR.
Alexander Wendt who pioneered this debate (1987: 337) put it well: “all social 
scientific theories embody an at least implicit solution to the ‘agent-structure 
problem,’ which situates agents and social structures in relation to one another.” His 
discussion (1987: 337) of neorealism and world system theory as the most dominant 
structural theories of IR in view of this problématique reveals that they solve the 
agent-structure problem by making either state agents or system structures 
‘ontologically primitive units.’ Neorealism defines the systemic structure in terms of 
agent-level properties and world system theory reifies the structure over the agents. 
Neorealism is reductionist or individualist by elevating agents, world system theory 
is holistic by taking structures as their ontological priorities. Both reduce one unit of 
analysis to the other. Another problem Wendt identifies (1987: 348) is that they both 
take their primitive units as "given and unproblematic.' Herein the agent-structure 
problem refers to the difficulties in developing theories that most successfully 
combine both the powers of agents and the causal relevance of structural factors 
without falling into reductionism and/or reification (Dessler, 1989: 443).
While the solutions to the problématique of agent-structure vary across scholars, they 
share a common assumption as to the viability of some sort of a solution to the issue. 
The first attempt in this manner has been made by Wendt (1987). His solution to the
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problem of agency-structure is to import Anthony Giddens’s structuration theory 
with a scientific realist basis developed by Roy Bashkar. Structurationism gives 
agents and structures ‘equal ontological status’ and sees them as ‘co-determined’ or 
‘mutually constituted’ entities (Wendt, 1987: 339). Two basic assumptions underlie 
Wendt’s argument: a rejection of a priori assumptions, inherent in all approaches in 
the study of IR, as to the role of agency or structure as a unit of analysis and their 
relative explanatory power vis-à-vis each other; and an emphasis on the existence of 
unobservable (social) structures and their constitutive powers. The applications of 
structuration theory to the IR solved the problem through ‘mutual constitution’ and 
codetermination of agent and structure. Wendt eschews giving ontological and 
explanatory priority to agents or to structures, but tries to overcome this duality by 
having recourse to the powers of both.
Similarly, subject and system are modelled in such a way that each can be explained 
or interpreted in terms of the other (Dryzek, Clark, McKenzie, 1989). Neither the 
agent (‘subject’) nor the structure (‘concourse pattern’) is reified or granted 
ontological priority. A ‘concourse structure’ is hence both constituted by individual 
subjects and once it gets firmly grounded it becomes constitutive of individuals’ 
subjectivity.
Along with the structurationist perspective, Walter Carlsnaes (1992) cites another 
solution: a morphogenetic approach originally suggested by Margaret Archer. This 
approch is seemingly more sophisticated for including the dimension of time and 
having a sequentalist nature of the mutual interaction between action and structure. 
The dialectical relationship between agent and structure in this formulation starts
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from somewhere and ends another locale where the relationship again gets started in 
a continuous manner.
David Dessler (1989:452) similarly but with some divergence develops a 
transformational model in which “structure both enables action and constrains its 
possibilities...[it] is the outcome as well as the medium of action.” Its resources are 
composed of both regulative and constitutive rules, which are not only the 
unintentional by-products but also intentional. Thus, for Dessler (1989: 467) 
structure is not just an environment or context but ‘a medium,’ and ‘a means’ to 
social action. Such a transformational construction of the agent-structure issue not 
only bridges the vertical alignment of units and systems but also develops horizontal 
linkages between issue ai'eas in IR (Dessler, 1989: 471-72).
Colin Wight (1999) takes Doty’s piece (1997) as his starting point to make clear 
some of the key contentious issues in the debate, and to vindicate some of charges 
against agent-structure writers in IR. The works of structurationists in IR should be 
considered as contributions and alternatives to the mainstream theories rather than as 
the final solutions to the problem (Wight, 1999: 111). He criticizes Doty in terms of 
her misrepresentation of agent-structure writers in IR taking either Bashkar’s or 
Giddens’s line of understanding structure, and either Giddens’ dialectical, mutual 
relationship between agent and structure or Archer’s sequentalist-time dimansional 
one. However, both Wight and Doty agree on the point that the agent did not receive 
the attention it has to. Since agency-structure writers are leaning towards structure, 
they have not theorized the role and nature of agency well.
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2.5. ONTOLOGY VERSUS EPISTEMOLOGY
The debate whether ontology is prior to epistemology or the other way round has 
taken place between Martin Hollis and Steve Smith on the one hand and Alexander 
Wendt and Walter Carlsnaes on the other hand. Hollis and Smith (1990; 1994: 241) 
basically argue that “there is always two stories to tell about the agency-structure 
debate.” All phenomena can be studied either from the agency side or the structme 
side depending on one’s ontological preference which is largely decided by his/her 
epistemological (explanation or understanding) preference. For them, (1994: 112, 
111) “epistemology matters because ontological disputes are not always (or ever) 
decidable by direct appeal to how the world is (since it is precisely that which is in 
dispute) and each party needs to give reasons for believing its case...ontological 
statements without an epistemological warrant are mere dogma.” Additionally, Hollis 
and Smith (1994: 250-51) maintain that “ontology crucially affects what can be 
accepted epistemologically, but contra Carlsnaes, we also believe that the reverse is 
also true. Epistemology can not be relegated to a second-order or less fundamental 
status.” Against those arguing the primacy of ontology, they argue (1994: 251) that 
“there is a hidden epistemology behind the claim that ontology is primary.” At last, 
however, they confess (1994: 246) that “the current debate seems to favour a 
[scientific] realist countermove to the effect that ontology is prior to epistemology.”
Two important conclusions can be derived from such a debate. First, the scholars on 
both sides demonstrate how deeply intertwined ontology and epistemology are. 
Second, the belief on the decidability of the agent-structure problématique and the 
proposition that agents and structures are mutually constituted is a presupposition on
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the part of constructivists contrary to their standard argument that constructivism 
does nothing for granted. In fact, however, they are aware of holding such a ‘given.’
2.6. EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY
Unlike the critical theorists of the Third Debate focusing on deep epistemological 
issues by proposing alternative epistemic practices, the main concern and departure 
point of constructivism in IR is the ontology it holds. Constructivists prioritize and 
problematize ontology and they assert that the ontological posture in large part 
affects what they take as epistemology and methodology. In ontological terms they 
hold that the world is socially constructed. Wendt (1998; 107), for example, argues 
that
the natural and social worlds are at least in part made of different 
kinds of staff, and that these ontological differences requhe different 
methods and data for their study. ... However, this does not imply 
different epistemologies for the natural and social sciences, since it is 
wrong to think that material conditions imply causal theorizing and 
ideas imply constitutive theorizing. Both kinds of staff have both 
causal and constitutive effects.
In spite of such ontological difference between the kinds of natural and social objects 
under inquiry, constructivism does not see fundamental epistemological differences 
between the natural and social sciences. Thus, the dichotomy between explanation 
and understanding is untenable. As Wendt (1998: 104) makes it clear that “The 
distinction between Explanation and Understanding (Hollis and Smith, 1990) is not 
one between explanation and description, but between explanations that answer 
different kinds of questions, causal and constitutive.” That is, both kinds of inquiry 
provide explanation but thi-ough asking different kinds of questions. Explanation asks 
why questions and engages in causal theorizing (causal explanation). Understanding
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ask how possible or what questions and engages in constitutive theorizing 
(constitutive explanation). In other words, constitutive theories also provide 
explanations but they are non-causal. Although the data and the methods differ when 
taking causal and constitutive theorizing, this does not imply an epistemological 
difference. Consequently, Wendt broadens the concept of explanation, which was 
exclusively the domain of science and causality, to include constitution and other 
descriptive ways of explanatory attempts.
Likewise, David Dessler (1999) sees positivism as subsuming easily the 
constructivist studies under its mainstream research. He argues that positivism can 
include some interpretive approaches since both positivism and those interpretive 
methodologies are rooted in realist epistemology. What makes positivism different 
from them is the narrow conceptualization of explanation, restraining it just to 
‘generalizing strategies’ of research techniques that are seeking recurring patterns. 
However, positivism also includes ‘particularizing strategies’ which list the details of 
happenings up to an event to be explained through historical construction. Because 
positivism is often equated with the former type of explanation, interpretive 
approaches are hardly thought to make use of positivist research techniques. 
Dessler’s reconceptualization of explanation in its broadest sense enables one to 
evaluate constructivism from positivist standards and to make use of its 
particularizing research techniques, such as process tracing.
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Constructivism holds a mode of reasoning by using such techniques as analogy, 
metaphor, symbols, practices, and narratives. It rejects ends-means calculations, 
which operate according to the logic of consequences. Such a logic is prevailing on 
rationalism in which agents/states are taken as . rational actors trying to maximize 
their utility functions, here a priori and exogenously determined interests—power 
and wealth. The mode of reasoning in constructivist scholarship instead is the logic 
of appropriateness (Finnemore, 1996a). Contrary to the consequential questions, 
agents ask “what kind of situation is this” and “what should I do” and act 
appropriately according to what the normative structure entails. Since the social 
structures and norms have the constitutive power of shaping the identities and 
interests of the agents, they do not just regulate the behaviors or constrain then· 
choices. Similarly, constructivism does not operate on a basis of ‘instrumental 
rationality’ but of ‘value rationality.’ In contrast to the economic mode of reasoning 
prevalent in neoliberalism, constructivists follow a sociological· approach (Dessler, 
1999).
Such modes of reasoning do not necessarily refute the status of science, causal 
explanation or empirical research. It embraces all yet with slight differences. Its 
understanding of causality—or ‘causal logic’—as Alexander Wendt articulates 
(1995: 76) has two elements, structure and agency, which emphasize ‘recursivity. ’ It 
demonstrates “how the social structure of a system makes actions possible by 
constituting actors with certain identities and interests, and material capabilities with 
certain meanings.”
2.7. MODE OF REASONING
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Constructivism as an orienting framework, or a research program is not monolithic. 
It basically comes in two forms, though under different labels: modernist and 
postmodernist (Wendt, 1995: 75), conventional and critical (Hopf, 1998), problem 
solving and critical (Adler, 1997:334, in Coxian terms). The deep epistemological 
contention of the Third Debate is also reflected within the constructivist camp and it 
divides the constructivists on epistemological grounds. Conventional constructivism 
has what Mark Hoffman calls ‘minimal foundationalism’ whereas critical 
constructivism is ‘anti/non-foundationaiist.’ However, both forms are situated within 
a broad range of critical scholarship because constructivim expands the contours of 
IR theory, promoting theoretical pluralism in Yosef Lapid’s (1989) characterization 
of postpositivist opening within IR.
A modernist constructivist John Ruggie (1998: 880) argues that even though 
“constructivism is non- or postpositivist in its epistemology” various strands of 
constructivism differ in terms of their peculiar epistemological grounds. Emanuel 
Adler (1997: 332) makes a distinction here between ‘constitutive’ and ‘mediative’ 
epistemological grounds. The usual practice of conflating these two distinct 
epistemological premises results in misunderstanding the relationship between 
constructivism and critical social theory and different variants of constructivism as 
well. Constitutivists hold that the reality can not be known outside or independent of, 
human language, discourse. They adopt a radical ‘relativist stance’ which has an 
exclusively discursive and textual approach for understanding reality. This is the 
epistemological basis of critical approaches like poststructuralism, postmodernism.
2.8. VARIANTS OF CONSTRUCTIVISM
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postmodern feminism and radical constructivism. On the other hand, mediative 
epistemology (Adler, 1997a: 324) holds that “social reality emerges from the 
attachment of meaning and functions to physical objects; collective understandings, 
such as norms, endow physical objects with purpose and therefore help constitute 
reality.” Constructivism in general embraces mediative epistemology maintaining 
that there is an objective reality out there but that it is attained and observed thi'ough 
our mediation. As Alexander Wendt, a modernist constructivist, argues, (1995: 75) 
“All observation is theory-laden in the sense that what we see is mediated by our 
existing theories, and to that extent knowledge is inherently problematic. But this 
does not mean that observation, let alone reality is theory-determined. The world is 
still out there constraining our beliefs, and may punish us for incorrect ones.”
Conventional constructivists can make use of a broad range of methodologies from 
positivist to interpretivist. They do not reject causality and can take ideational factors 
without hesiatation in causal formats. Conversely, radical or critical constructivists 
just take on interpretivist methodologies relying particularly on textual and 
discursive analyses. They are sceptical of causality and therefore much more inclined 
to hermeneutics emphasizing exclusive ‘recursivity.’ All in all, the different strands 
of constructivism can be measured according to the extent of how far they are 
distant/close from/to critical approaches or ffom/to mainstream approaches in terms 
of epistemology and methodology.
Where constructivism and critical theories closely converge is the area of ontology. 
For both constructivists and critical theorists, the world is socially constructed. Both 
suggest that international politics—the actors,, institutions, power, structure, anarchy,
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etc.—is not ontologically fixed or eternal but historically contingent across time and 
space. They do not take for granted the ontological assumptions held as to 
international politics. They are all questioning the nature of international politics and 
all ontological presuppositions are put into réévaluation. However, modern and 
postmodern constructivists differ on the point that modern constructivism explores 
the processes through which the existing taken-for-granted elements of world poltics 
have been constructed while critical constructivists attempt to go beyond that and 
ask how these constructions could have been different through different narratives.
Both modern and postmodern constructivists emphasize the role and importance of 
intersubjective structures and collective meanings for understanding the social world. 
Again the difference however arises as to the content of those structures. Modernists 
such as Alexander Wendt (1995: 73) postulate the composition of social structures as 
“shared knowledge, material resources and practices” and take them as “real and 
objective, not ‘just talk,’ ” while postmodern constructivists solely rely on discursive 
practices, and thus downgrade the material resources in forming social structures.
Constructivists for the most pait take identities, norms and cultures as independent 
explanatory variables with constitutive powers but the conceptualization of these 
terms and their explanatory power differ according to by whom they are employed. 
One point of difference is causality—explanatory power—and the other is 
normative—identity conceptualization. Modern constructivists explore and discover 
how particular identities ai'e socially constructed and they make use of them through 
empowering causal roles because they think that the structures of identities, norms 
and cultures are relatively stable and enduring. Identities are conceptualized in terms
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of a self-other dialectic by having recourse to structurationist perspective. Modern 
constructivists therefore have no normative interest as to the peculiar construction or 
changing of identities. In contrast to modernists, postmodern constructivists seek to 
discover not only the myths associated with a particular identity formation but also to 
discover alternative narratives for that formation. They are also sceptical of causality 
attributed to contested and constructed identities. They emphasize the contested 
nature and multiple dimensions of identities. Furthermore, they conceptualize 
identities in terms of a ‘dialogism’ incorporating an axiological dimension of value 
judgement as to the ‘other.’ They have thus a normative commitment in the sense 
that identities are defined with a respect for difference in terms of the self-other 
constitution.
Modern and postmodern constructivists accept the constitutive or quasi-causal power 
of knowledge, ideas and social practices in contrast to the straight causality of 
behavioralists or meaning oriented behavioralists (Yee, 1996). These are valued not 
as individual level phenomena and properties but in fact as collective, shared 
meanings and practices (Laffey & Weldes, 1997). For modernists they are social 
facts though unobservable, because they show resistance when we act upon them. 
Their effects and constitutive powers are known with observable outcomes. 
Constructivism for all strands is reflexive in the sense that both agents and structures 
are mutually constructed and they are co-determined. Individuals and society 
constitute each other.
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Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) as a subfield of IR can be understood by locating it 
within a general development of the discipline. It is organized and studied by Valerie 
Hudson and Christopher Vore (1995: 209-38) under thi'ee major categories: 
comparative foreign policy (CFP) analysis, foreign policy decision making and 
foreign policy context. The CFP researches, strive for creating a general unified 
theory through multilevel, cross national empirical works with the rise of 
behavioralism. However, the methodologies of ‘events data’ and integrated 
explanations for that matter has not yet produced tangible results. The study of 
foreign policy decision making has a gained momentum after the apparent downfall 
of CFP and focused on small group dynamics, organizational processes and 
bureaucratic politics. The third kind of study in foreign policy analysis emphasizes 
the salience of the context within which the objects and the subjects of the foreign 
policy are constructed. The foreign policy context involves individual characteristics, 
perceptions, society and culture, the domestic pohty and the international system.
2.9. FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS
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Foreign policy approaches can be categorized as follows.
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Walter Carlsnaes (1992).
The table demonstrates that approaches to FPA are not only conditioned by ontology 
but also by epistemology—the problem of objectivity or subjectivity. Steve Smith 
(1985: 45-55) has succinctly identified the epistemological dividing line between the 
American and British approaches to FPA. The comparative foreign policy of the 
Americans contrasts with the historical-descriptive case study approach of the 
British. While CFP is a social scientific endeavour, British scholars are in most part 
sceptical of such attempts. British scholars emphasize the uniqueness of each 
country’s individual foreign policy whereas the traditionalists state the functional 
similarities between the foreign policies of states. Following this distinction, it is 
possible to categorize the approaches to FPA as positivist and postpositivist. In what 
follows, a constructivist framework for FPA is established.
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Post-positivist approaches have made their impact on FPA (White, 1999) in that they 
all challenge what the previous approaches have taken for granted and contribute 
new issues to be discussed. First, the institutionalist and historical sociologists’ 
studies heightened an interest on the nature of state, and thus began to argue that 
different types of states, and/or different pathways to state formation produce 
different foreign policy behaviors. The postmodernists emphasized the importance of 
identity and difference as the principle medium of relationships in community 
interactions. Self and other distinction, or more correctly the formation of self and 
the other dn turn affects the foreign policies of actors in world politics. The 
poststructuralist studies focused on the linguistic construction of reality. The role of 
discourse in defining and thus constructing the foreign policy context within which 
foreign policy making process is running results in specific decisions.
Postpositivist FPA as Roxanne Lynn Doty (1993: 298) notes, in contrast to 
conventional foreign policy analysis which asks why questions, seek answers to 'how 
possible questions' as well as it examining how meanings are produced and attached 
to various social subjects/objects, thus constituting particulai’ interpretive dispositions 
which create certain possibilities and preclude others. What is explained is not why a 
particular outcome obtained, but rather how the subjects, objects, and interpretive 
dispositions were socially constructed such that certain practices were made possible.
The problem of FPA in constructivism is “how to make analytically operational tN; 
core assumptions that both agents and structures interact reciprocally in determining
2.10. CONSTRUCTIVISM AND FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS
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the foreign policy behavior of sovereign states” (Carlsnaes, 1992: 250). Giddens’s 
formulation of structuration theory-agents and structures mutually constitute each 
other—and Archer’s conception of morphogenesis—structures both predate and 
postdate actions, the ontological notion of a continuous cycle of action-structure 
interactions are the welcoming synthetic solutions to the agent-structure debate 
(Carlsnaes, 1992: 256-260). However, on the question of intersubjectivity—social 
collective meanings—Carlsnaes is ambiguous. Constructivism is thus to be at the 
intersection of four quadrants if we follow the middle approach of Adler (1997a). In 
addition to that, constructivism, like game theory, is impartial: neither optimist nor 
pessimist, neither realist nor liberal and neither holding realpolitik nor idealpolitik a 
priori. Therefore, the debate between realism and idealism is untenable for 
constructivism (Wendt: 1987; 1992). Both realpolitik and idealpolitik can be social 
constructions based on ideational sources (Johnston, 1995a; 1995b, 1996) because 
intersubjective institutions can be either cooperative or conflictual. There is no a 
priori assumption as to such nature of the world but it is socially constructed, 
historically contingent.
The contructivist departure here is this that the intersubjective, discursive, and 
linguistic context which provides the means available to policy makers to attach 
meanings to certain objects, defines the environment and the situations they face. It 
examines and investigates not only the environment circumventing individual policy 
makers but also their practices which either instantiate or transform the existing 
cultural and normative milieu.
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Constructivism does not wholly disavow the importance of material resources as 
radical constructivists do but it examines how cognitions are attributed to the 
material factors. For example, the missiles iri a country may pose a threat to some 
states; and not to others. They may even be regarded by some as tools of security. In 
other words, the same missiles have different meanings for different actors across 
time and space because the meanings attached to these material resources differ 
depending on the nature of social structure (of enmity or amity) between the actors.
Constructivism is in fact an ambitious attempt to build a synthetic approach in IR 
theory and FPA. This has two dimensions: the first is to integrate agents and 
structures, micro-macro, unit and system on the one hand; the second is to bridge 
objectivity and subjectivity, explanation and understanding, causality and 
hermeneutical cii'cle. They therefore endeavor to develop a structurationist (agent- 
structure) approach with intersubjectivity (objectivity and subjectivity) as a 
methodology of constitution, and recursivity (causality and radical constructivism, 
interpretivism). For this reason, Emanuel Adler (1997; 323) depicts constructivism as 
providing the first real opportunity to generate a synthetic approach in IR since E.H. 
Carr.
The constructivist approach to the FPA as our departure has many insights to offer:
1) It first offers a structurationist perspective with a view to the perennial issue of 
agency-structure in IR theory and FPA.
2) It helps us identify the sources for constructing the national interests which are 
constitutive for the immediate state actions and behaviours.
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3) It saves the identity politics from postmodernists and holds it in a firmer ground 
that makes it more intelligible in state behaviours. Yet it does not just study the 
identity impact on foreign policy but looks at the deeper processes of identity and 
interest formation.
4) It focuses on the foreign policy making processes within which ideas, culture, 
knowledge, images, discourses, analogies, metaphors translate into specific 
policy making proposals to constitute the policy agenda.
Out of such insights, identity (state identity) and culture (strategic culture) with a 
view to security politics are taken up as the frameworks for applying to Turkish- 
Greek and Turkish-Israeli relations in the post-Cold War era. Our next chapter 
addresses identity, culture and security in generally. The following chapter applies 
these insights to the Turkish-Greek and Turkish-Israeli relations.
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CHAPTER 3: IDENTITY AND CULTURE IN FOREIGN AND
SECURITY POLICY
3.1. CONSTRUCTIVISM AND IDENTITY
The Identity issue has been central in several disciplines of social science: 
psychology, sociology, literary theory, and social anthropology. Iver B. Neumann 
(1996) suggests four different paths for identity theorizing in social theory—the 
ethnographic path, the psychological path, the Continental philosophical path, and 
the ‘Eastern excursion.’ The ethnographic path entails the delineation of in-group 
from out-groups, the psychological path characterizes the working of the boundary 
between an ‘us’ and a ‘them’, the Continental philosophical path represents the ‘high 
road of modernity’ imbued with Marxian dialectics, and the Eastern excursion stands 
at the margins of the high road offering an alternative path to theorize identity 
through ‘dialogism’ incorporating the axiological dimension of value judgement as 
to the other instead dialectics.
The identity problématique entered into IR full fledged with the critical theories of 
the third debate. Fii'st, James Der Derian’s genealogy of diplomacy (1987) 
demonstrated how the selves and others as human collectivities of states mediate 
their estrangement by means of diplomacy. Second, Michael J. Shapiro (1988) 
asserted that ‘foreign policy is about making an other’ and that self-other relations 
should be understood in their historicity, as emergent entities of historical 
contingency with a view to time and space. Third, David Campbell in his Writing 
Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (1992) describes 
US foreign policy as a web of discourse and political practice. The US self is a
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narrative of all those discourses and practices regarding its foreign relations. The US 
in a sense is an imagined community at its extreme. In another work, David 
Campbell (1993: 26) notes that
Because a notion of who/what ‘we’ ai'e is intertwined with an 
understanding of who/what ‘we’ are not and who/what ‘we’ fear, 
‘Iraq’ exists in a discourse economy out of which the ‘United States’ 
(among others) draws and accumulates the moral capital necessary to 
secure its identity.
Critical approaches to the identity issue in IR theory have been revolving around the 
margins of the discipline. The constructivist engagement has helped center it in IR. 
Alexander Wendt’s (1992) article ‘Anarchy is what states make of it: the social 
construction of power politics’ transposed the question of identity formation and 
collective identity from the margins of the discipline to the mainstream. As Jeffrey 
Checkel (1998: 325) notes, “constructivists rescued the exploration of identity from 
postmodernists.”
Identities as defined by Alexander Wendt (1992: 397) are “relatively stable, role- 
specific understandings and expectations about self ” and are “inherently relational.” 
The intersubjective understandings and expectations, collective meanings or social 
structures arising out of interactions among actors constitute them. He (1992: 399) 
explicates the term identity through making references to his peculiar conception of 
‘institution.’
Institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart 
from actors’ ideas about how the world works. ...institutions come to 
confront individuals as more or less coercive social facts, but they are 
still a function of what actors collectively ‘know.’ Identities and such 
collective cognitions do not exist apart from each other; they are 
‘mutually constitutive.’
On this view, identities are largely the property of agents in world politics, and
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institutions (structures of normative and social cognitions as well as material 
properties) are constructed and also institutionalized dialectically with a view to each 
other akin to the agent-structure resolution of structuration theory. From such a 
perspective, (Wendt, 1992: 399) “institutionalization is a process of internalizing 
new identities and interests, not something occurring outside them and affecting only 
behavior ...institutions may be cooperative or conflictual, ...but relatively stable 
self-other relations—even those of ‘enemies’—are defined intersubjectively.” As 
such, Emanuel Adler (1997: 324) notes that “the identities, interests and behavior of 
political agents are socially constructed by collective meanings, interpretations and 
assumptions about the world.” Identities are socially and relationally 
(intersubjectively) defined but they are also constitutive of what/how a particular 
institution of international social structure is.
Identity formation is endogenous to interaction. Conceptions of self and interest tend 
to ‘mirror’ the practices of significant others over time. This principle of identity 
formation is best captured by the symbolic interactionist notion of the ‘looking-glass 
self,’ which asserts that the self is a reflection of an actor’s socialization (Wendt, 
1992: 404). Alexander Wendt (1992: 406) notes that “it is through reciprocal 
interaction, in other words, that we create and instantiate the relatively enduring 
social structures in terms of which we define our identities and interests.”
“Identities are the basis of interests” (Wendt, 1992: 398). They provide the necessary 
lens for actors to define what/how the situation is and what/how a role they are 
expected to adopt and play in it. Without such a definitional tool, to determine what 
the interests are at stake for an actor would be difficult. There is an inextricable
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relationship between identities and interests .as such that the interests are defined 
when the roles and identities are constituted. Interests are socially constructed in 
terms of peculiar social identities of actors in world politics. Interests are not 
something fixed or constant across different actors but varying constructions with a 
view to particular definition of actors’ social identities and their specific 
configurations.
To sum up the arguments about identity issue made so far (Jepperson et al, 
1996:52):
1. Cultural or institutional elements of states’ global or domestic environments 
(norms most often) shape state identity.
2. Variation in state identity or changes in state identity, affect the national security 
interests or policies of states.
3. Configurations of state identity affect interstate normative structures, such as 
regimes or security communities.
State identities have two effects therefore,' one is direct—shaping the national 
interests—the other is indirect—affecting the nature of the security system through 
shaping the interstate normative structui-e that in turn shapes the practices of actors. 
Cooperative intersubjective structures construct friends and thus peaceful security 
communities whereas conflictual ones produce security dilemmas through 
constituting enemies. Turkish-Israeli and Turkish-Greek relations can be analyzed 
from the point “how states seek to enact or institutionalize their identities (potentially 
shifting or multiple ones) in interstate normative structures, including regimes and 
security communities” (Jepperson et al., 1996: 62).
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A collective identity constituted at a higher level of aggregation than the state—such 
as an international or regional institution—also has a constitutive effect in 
constructing identities of its constituting members. Thomas Risse-Kappen (1996) 
notes that NATO represents an institutionalized identity of democratic allies 
culminating in a pluralistic security community in which a security of each is 
considered the responsibility of all. National interests become the interests of NATO. 
Because collective identity formation is a process of defining who ‘we’ are, at the 
same time it delineates the boundaries with and against the ‘other.’ This collective 
identity then prescribes the norms of rules and roles members are to take towai'ds 
those perceived as ‘us’ and those perceived as the ‘other.’
3.2. IDENTITY AND SECURITY
Security issues have predominantly been the domains of the realist tradition in IR. 
The neglect of, or simply the resistance to, identity questions within the realist 
research program leads one to think there is no value to identity in explaining 
national security issues and policies. Recently, the call for identity and culture in 
realist and neorealist agenda of security is a clear indication of such image (Lapid & 
Kratochwil, 1996). As Michael C. Williams, however, argues (1998: 205) this is not 
the case.
Identity concerns have never been missing from theorizing about 
international relations and security. On the contrary, a specific 
conception of identity is in fact constitutive of, rather than missing 
from, prevailing theories of international relations and security. .. .The 
apparent absence of a concern with identity in conceptions of security 
needs to be understood in fact as an historical legacy of a conscious 
attempt to exclude identity concerns from the political realm...
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However, identity concerns have emerged in the English School, the liberal tradition, 
critical approaches, the Copenhagen School and social constructivism in IR. Our 
departure here is to some references to writers in Copenhagen School and to 
constructivism primarily. The Copenhagen School, as its representatives affirm, has 
strong doses of constructivism and is much close to constructivism in their identity 
and security studies than mainstream in IR. As Barry Buzan and Ole Waever point 
out (1997: 243, in note 6),
We prefer to take a social constructivist position ‘all the way down.’ 
However, identities as other · social constructions can petrify and 
become relatively constant elements to be reckoned with. Especially, 
we believe security studies could gain by a constructivism that 
focuses on how the very security quality is always socially 
constructed: issues are not security issues by themselves, but defined 
as such as a result of political processes.
Identities and security issues are socially constructed within a given social structure 
thi'ough numerous processes and social, discursive practices. Buzan and Waever 
(1997: 243) argue that “when an identity is thus constructed and becomes socially 
sedimented, it becomes a possible referent object for security.” Identity as a relative 
stable construction not easily malleable, ' would be an object for security 
considerations. The Copenhagen school furthermore makes a distinction between 
state and societal security (Ole Waever, 1995: 67). From such a distinction, the 
sovereign identity of the state and the societal collective identity both appear as 
emergent concerns of security studies. The definition of identity determines 
collectively the object to be secured.
Barry Buzan (1995: 189) argues that “For all states, the security problématique has 
two faces, internal and external.” Internal and external threats might be directed 
towards both domestic society and/or state. The historical sociology of states (the
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formation of their social identities) is very important for the construction of the kind 
and sectors of threats. As he (1995; 188-89) further notes that “differences in internal 
construction have a substantial impact on how states define thi'eats and 
vulnerabilities, and therefore on the whole construction of the security 
problématique....”
3.3. CULTURE AND NORMS
Cultural and norm theorizing in IR became attractive in the post-Cold war era when 
the ideational factors gained importance in view of the decaying Cold War structure 
and the ushering in of the postpositivist era in IR theory. The renewed interest to 
culture and norms increased mainly due to the dissatisfaction both with general 
theories predicting similar outcomes from different actors across various cases and 
crude positivism with a strict materialism in general. Cultural theories both involve 
the ideational elements and at the domestic level indicate the uniqueness or sui 
generis character of the cases. The main concern of cultural approach against the 
dominance of strict materialism is to emphasize non-materialist factors for a better 
understanding of how world politics operates. Constructivism as a research program 
in this sense has been offering a comprehensive and explanatory path of cultural and 
norm theorizing.
3.3.1. GLOBAL CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS
Global cultural theories expect different units to behave or respond in a similar way 
when they are exposed to the same global cultural and institutional forces. This
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approach is like an ideational version of structural realism, which emphasizes the 
determining power of global distribution of power, the material capabilities. In this 
camp, the approach Martha Finnemore develops is a social structural version of 
international politics. It benefits notably from the structure side of the agent-structure 
debate. Finnemore (1996: 5-6) notes very explicitly that “The international system 
can change what states want. It is constitutive and generative, creating new interests 
and values for actors. It changes state action, not by constraining states with a given 
set of preferences from acting, but by changing their preferences.” The international 
social—normative and institutional—structures can provide states with dkection and 
goals for action. The values they embody and the rules and roles they define channel 
behavior. Actors conform to them not just because of self-interest or utility 
maximization but also because of that they are socialized to accept and internalize 
these global norms, values and roles. As a result, state interests which are the sources 
of their behaviors and foreign policy outcomes are not determined by external tlu'eats 
or domestic forces but internationally shared norms and values shape them.
Norms play a major role in constructivist international politics. In general, a norm is 
defined as (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891) “a standard of appropriate behavior 
for actors with a given identity.” Norms thus favour certain behaviours as opposed to 
others. They attribute an ‘oughtness’—actors are supposed to act in accordance with
the prevailing existing norms. More specifically, however, norms can be divided into
(
two brands as regulative and constitutive norms (see Kratochwil, 1989). Regulative 
norms function as ordering and organizing or constraining the behaviours of the 
actors whereas constitutive norms have far reaching implications; they not only 
affect the behaviours on the surface but also in a deeper sense create new identities
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and interests for actors. Constructivists regard norms as constitutive. On the other 
hand, realists and liberals view norms as merely regulative. Norms are thus taken to 
be just intervening variables. Neorealists see them as what the great powers had 
created for their hegemonic interests (e.g., hegemonic stability theory), for 
neoliberals they are the constraints on the behaviours of the actors (e.g., regime 
analysis).
Theorists of norms advance some propositions about the origins and emergence of 
international norms (Finnemore, 1996b; Florini, 1996), the processes through which 
norms influence actors’ behaviours and which norms matter under what conditions 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). In terms of evolution of norms, for instance, Richard 
Price (1995), along with Nina Tannenwald (1996) analyse the chemical weapons 
‘taboo’ in view of how it emerged as an amoral and abnormal means of warfai'e and 
it became globally prevalent as a norm. Samuel Barkin (1998) examines the 
compatible development of the human rights norm with another institutionalized 
norm of international society, sovereignty. Martha Finnemore (1996c) traces the 
development of humanitarian norms through the humanitarian concerns of 
international (basically Western) society.
The empirical studies on the effects of norms are also highly visible on a range of 
issue areas, from education to security studies, environment to economic interactions 
(Finnemore, 1996b). The most vivid example in IR is the end of apartheid regime in 
South Africa under the structural influence of normative factors. As Audie Klotz 
(1996) argues, the normative consensus—racial equality—led to the adoption of 
international—multilateral and bilateral—sanctions which in turn influenced decision
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makers to initiate reforms resulting in the abolition of apartheid regime in South 
Africa. In another work, he (1995: 453) “state interest formation [is] a global, rather 
than an insulated domestic, process.” Global norms play an important role in 
determining state identities and interests, which decisively shape their policies. 
Klotz’s (1995: 451-78) analysis of changes in US policy toward South Africa 
demonstrates that global norms can make the reconstitution of interests dkectly 
through ‘transnational processes,’ not with state level interaction or multilateral 
coercion.
Taken as a whole, constructivist works on world culture and norms practically 
promoted the normative structural theorizing while ignoring the differences in 
domestic cultural context of the agents. Constructivism therefore underspecifies the 
agent—that is how the agents constitute the content of social structures in the first 
place in the mutual constitution of agency and structure.
3.3.2. DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONAL AND CULTURAL STRUCTURES
Jeffrey Checkel (1998: 325) argues that “Constructivism lacks a theory of agency.” 
He then tries to develop agent level theorizing and to demonstrate its relation to 
structure, and vice versa. The global norms and culture, for instance, at the 
international structural level can diffuse to the domestic polities of states through the 
function of internal cultural and institutional structure (Checkel, 1997, 1999; 
Gurowitz, 1999). Some states are more amenable to the structural constitution while 
some demonstrate more resistance. State-society relations and civil-military relations 
as well indicate the nature of domestic cultural and institutional structure.
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International norms and rules affect state behaviors not automatically but through the 
actions of domestic political and state elites (Cortel and Davis, 1996). In addition to 
the pattern of state-societal relations, the structure of decision-making authority and 
the domestic salience of the norms under question determine the extent domestic 
actors (government and bureaucratic officials, societal interest groups) appeal, 
appropriate and internalize international norms and rules. Consequently, institutional 
structures affect the parameters of strategic culture largely built upon domestic 
political-military and organizational cultures. An agential focus enables one to 
understand thus the formation of national preferences, security priorities, strategic 
ends and means.
Domestic political-military culture matters in foreign and security policies. Thomas 
Berger (1996; 325-26) defines political culture as “the cultural beliefs and values that 
shape a given society’s orientations toward politics. Pohtical-military culture in turn 
refers to the subset of the larger political culture that influences how members of a 
given society view national security, the military as an institution, and the use of 
force in international relations.” Pacified, democratic, and antimilitary political 
cultures, defensive, democratic. and transparent military cultures have shaped their 
policies over about five decades. Non-nuclear, non-aggressive, and defensive, 
multilateral strategies are the products of domestic political-military culture. This is 
so much overriding that the security policies of these countries have not changed 
even though the Cold War structure has waned.
Jeffrey Legro (1996: 119-23) also argues that preference formation is a function of 
domestic social and bureaucratic cultural influence. His approach asserts that the
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beliefs and values embedded in bureaucracies and military can shape what the 
national interests would be. Organizational predilection does so through two 
processes. First, organizational culture influences bureaucratic orientation and 
second, bureaucratic priorities shape national preferences and policies. The influence 
of any institution, however, in preference formation is dependent on the 
organization’s salience determined by the monopoly power on expertise, the 
complexity of the issue under consideration, and the time limit available for action. 
Therefore, domestic structure and the distribution of power domestically are 
important for the degree of any institution’s influence in preference formation.
Organizational culture is defined by Kier (1995: 69-70; 1996; see also Legro, 1996: 
121) as “the set of basic assumptions and values that shape shared understandings, 
and the forms or practices whereby these meanings are expressed, affirmed, and 
communicated to the members of an organization.” Then, Kier (1996: 202-03) 
defines the culture of military organization “as the collection of ideas and beliefs 
about armed forces—both its conduct and its relationship to the v/ider society.” This 
is quite constructivist in the sense that it emphasizes the shared understandings; that 
is, intersubjective structures at the level of military institution. In terms of 
relationship between military organizational culture and domestic politico-military 
subculture on the formation of military doctrine, Kier (1995) argues that the domestic 
distribution of power and civilian policy makers’ beliefs about military force and its 
role can affect and shape the organizational culture of the military. This 
organizational culture in turn shapes the choice of either offensive or defensive 
military strategy. This preference is not derived from the international balance of 
power or bureaucratic interests of military. There is no a priori preference for an
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offensive or defensive doctrine within a military culture from a functional logic but it 
is the product of organizational culture of military. Culture therefore has an 
independent power and preferences are endogenous and constructed within such 
cultural contexts.
Strategic culture questions ahistorical and acultural explanations of strategic choice.
It looks for strategic preferences in history and culture, not in system structure or the
distribution of state capabilities. Bradley Kleiii (1988: 139) sees strategic culture as a
product of historical experience. Different states thus exhibit different strategic
cultures because they have different historical experiences. Klein (1994) argues that
the concepts such as state, sovereignty, deterrence, and the apparent dichotomises of
foreign-domestic, inside-outside, order-anarchy, peace-war, us-them are all social
constructs out os social practices within a given context of identity and culture.
Strategic violence has a constitutive character. It does create not only dialectically
opposed qualities and thus enemies but also ascribe meanings to them. “Strategic
violence is then called upon to mediate the relationship, patrol the border, surveil the
opponent, and punish its aggression (Klein, 1994: 6).” Klein treats military strategy
as a cultural practice, a reflection of hegemonic political order.
Strategic culture... in VO Ives widely available orientations to violence 
and to ways in which the state can legitimately use violence against 
putative enemies. In this sense popular representations of violence and 
of the ‘enemy’ against whom violence is to be legitimately deployed 
become significant artefacts in so far as they construct as plausible a 
distinct range of identities and render others unavailable or 
implausible. To study strategic culture is to study the cultural 
hegemony of organized state violence. (Klein, 1988: 136)
In the case of NATO’s strategy, Klein argues (1990: 313); the strategic policy of 
nuclear deterrence follows an internal logic that it is not an attempt to counterbalance
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the Soviet nuclear capabilities but ‘an attempt to resolve contradictions and dilemmas 
internal to Western strategy.’ NATO is thus a set of practices by which the West has 
constituted itself as a political and cultural identity.
Alastair Iain Johnston tries to develop a more precise conceptualization of strategic
culture and to construct a more rigorous methodology to make the empirical works
more fruitful. He defines (1995: 46) strategic culture as
an integrated ‘system of symbols’ (e.g. argumentation structures, 
languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive 
and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the 
role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by 
clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the 
strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.
Such a definition makes the concept empirically falsifiable and provides predictions 
over the strategic choices and enables us to observe empirical referents (symbols and 
ranked preferences) in strategic culture objects (texts, documents, doctrines). Three 
basic assumptions as to— the role of war (whether it is aberrant or inevitable), the 
nature of the adversary and the thi'eat it poses (zero sum or positive sum) and the 
efficacy of the use of force (the belief that the use of force is useful or not)—and the 
most preferred method of responding to threat environment determine the nature of 
strategic culture (Johnston, 1995, 46-47; 1995b: 37; 1996). Offensive or defensive 
strategies, realpolitik or idealpolitik strategic culture are defined according to the 
answers given to these three questions and relatedly to preferred methods of 
engaging with the threat environment. Furthermore, strategic culture is relatively 
persistent and has the ability to reproduce the existing cultural structure over time 
even though it is malleable to change. It is largely about the means to follow the
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preferences rather than the interests themselves. ‘ Strategic culture is very much 
consistent with constructivism in that it refers to the collectively held beliefs rather 
than individual belief systems, operational code, individual cognitive and 
psychological analyses. Secondly, the units of analysis focus on the collectively 
produced and shared artifacts rather than individual beliefs or cognitions (Johnston, 
1995b: 37, in note 3).
To sum up the role of domestic culture and norms in national security matters, two 
effects are noted (Jepperson et al., 1996: 52-60). First, cultural, institutional and 
normative environments of states shape the national interests and security policies of 
them. Second, cultural and institutional structures shape the identities of the actors 
(here states). In what follows, the nature and social structure of security relations 
between states is constructed by having recourse to both identity and interest 
formation through interstate practices and domestic narratives, strategic culture of 
security.
3.4. CONSTRUCTING SECURITY SYSTEMS:
INTERSTATE PRACTICES OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST FORMATION
Though the international system remains anarchic, the security relations between 
particular states change from anarchy to hierarchy and take different forms as 
alliance, protectorate, informal empire and empire within a continuum defined by the 
degree of hierarchy between the parties (Lake, 1996: 6). In this regard, while the US · 
Western European relations took the form of anarchic alliance institutionalized in
* Similar distinction between the ‘preferences over actions’ and ‘preferences over interests’ is made by 
Powell, Robert. 1994. “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal
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NATO, the Soviet Union chose a more hierarchical relationship in Eastern Europe as 
embodied in Wai'saw Pact. However, the NATO is an institution of collective 
identity formation more than a security relationship against the Soviet threat (Risse- 
Kappen, 1996). The hierarchical relationship in the Soviet case is the intersubjective 
knowledge of legitimacy and submission on a basis of material inequalities (Wendt 
& Friedheim, 1995).
The conceptualization of security therefore differs because the prevailing self-help
security system is a social construction involving mutual-exclusionary identity and
interest formation and security (threat) construction that would otherwise be
constructed. Alexander Wendt (1992: 399-400) notes that
Self-help is an institution, one of various structures of identity and 
interest that may exist under anarchy. Processes of identity formation 
under anarchy are concerned first and foremost with preservation or 
‘security’ of the self Concepts of security therefore differ in the 
extent to which and the manner in which the self is identified 
cognitively with the other, and, ... it is upon this cognitive variation 
that the meaning of anarchy and distribution of power depends.
Practice, as the constructivist solution to the agency-structure problématique would 
be the defining parameter of security systems. The practices of the actors constitute 
in the first place the structures, which in turn shape or define the actor’s practices 
either directly or through constituting their identities and thus interests. 
Consequently, three possible security systems—competitive, individualistic and 
cooperative security systems—emerge out of such cognitive variation thi'ough the 
interaction of actors in which their identities and interests are in fact constructed. A 
competitive security system is the one in which actors negatively identify with each 
other’s security concerns. Thus, a zero sum game operates—one’s loss is another’s
Debate,” International Organization 4S{2): 313-44.
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gain—and the potential war of all against all is the basic axiom. In such a social 
structure, relative concerns have primacy and hinder collective action. An 
individualistic security is one, neoliberal scholars ai'gue like the market, in which 
actors are concerned only with their security interests but for them concern with only 
absolute gains overcomes collective action problems. Finally, cooperative security 
systems refer to the positive identification among the security interests of actors. 
That is, the security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all. The interests of 
individual actors become those of the community—the representative of the 
collective identity that the actors developed through positive identification with each 
other at the institutional level. However, the scope and degree of identification with 
the community/collective identity varies so that the nature of community changes 
from a limited form of ‘concerts’, ‘allies’, to the collective security arrangements 
within a continuum of cooperative security system.
Emanuel Adler’s conception of ‘security communities’ is much like the cooperative 
security system of Wendt. Adler (1997b: 258) defines it as such that “Security 
communities are socially constructed because shared meanings, constituted by 
interaction, engender collective identities. They are dependent upon communication, 
discourse, and interpretation, as well as on material environments.” As the ‘practical 
knowledge of the peaceful resolution of conflicts’ shared by the members constitutes 
the foundation for security communities, they are in fact ‘cognitive regions or 
structures’ in which cognitive processes are at work, not subjective factors as 
feelings, emotions and affection (Adler, 1997b: 263-64). What constitutes the 
security communities therefore is the ‘mutual responsiveness’ developed out of 
answers to the questions of ‘who I am’ and ‘who the other is’ i.e., common identity
71
and intersubjective understandings, values, and norms (Adler, 1997b: 264, 254). 
Nonetheless, Adler (1997b: 255) points to the limits of this type of communities as 
such that “the existence of security communities does not mean that interest-based 
behaviour by states will end, that material factors will cease to shape interstate 
practices, and that security dilemmas will end.”
The relationship between identity/ interest formation and security relations/system, 
however, is not just a function of interstate interaction but also domestic strategic 
culture in which how thi'eats, security are constructed and thus national interests, 
preferences for state actions are decided.
3.5. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SECURITY:
NATIONAL INTERESTS, THREATS AND STRATEGY
Reality is socially constructed in constructivism. Contructivists basically agree with 
what realists argue about international relations but they hold that the realist 
assumptions are not natural, fixed or eternal (Wendt, 1995: 72). Identity, national 
interests, self-help security environment and threats, among others, are important for 
the formulation and implementation of states’ security and foreign policies but they 
are socially constructed. Accordingly, their explanatory powers do not come from 
material bases but from the collective meanings attached to those material resources. 
This shared knowledge is constituted by the social practices and processes generated 
through mutual interaction and constitution of agents and structures. Social practices 
are manifested through both linguistic games, discursive elements, collectively held 
ideas, beliefs and actors’ meaningful acts, behaviors, dispositions defined within a
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given social structure. Ideas, beliefs, narratives are important but not in the sense that 
they are just in one’s head but important when they are collectively held or shared 
and capable of constituting the material resources, moves, and actions meaningful. 
Security envii'onments, thi'eats, and thus national interests are defined by such 
factors.
Ole Waever, for instance, (1995: 55) treats security as ‘a speech act’ and focuses on 
the processes of ‘securitization’ and ‘desecuritization.’ Security is constituted 
through discourses and rhetoric so as to frame an issue as a security problem. As 
Waever (1995: 54) notes that “something is a security problem when the elites 
declare it to be so.’’ Security is something that is created or produced and thus dkects 
state preferences.
The concept of national interest has an important role both to constitute and to
legimitize state actions. However, the national interest is ‘a social construction’
(Weldes, 1996: 276). Taking it from a constructivist perspective,, it is argued that the
concept of national interest has important explanatory power if it is taken as a social
construction because it is not fixed, natural or universal as realists claim. What is
important is its content, which is constituted through various processes and as a
result of which the national interests are determined. The construction processes are
diverse from the interstate interactions and the domestic plays of state and society to
the social structure of the international system which all have some constitutive
power contingent across time and space. As Jutta Weldes (1996: 280) notes that
national interests are social constructions created as meaningful 
objects out of the intersubjective and culturally established meanings 
with which the world, particularly the international system and the 
place of state in it, is understood. More specifically, national interests 
emerge out of the representations—or, to use more customary
. 73
terminology, out of situation descriptions and problem definitions— 
through which state officials and others make sense of the world 
around them.
State and political elites particularly define what/how the envii-onment is about, 
friendly or threatening before taking action. Jutta Weldes and Diana Saco (1996) 
explain the distinct US hostile attitude and its persistent combatant policies towards 
Cuba through a particulai' construction of ‘Cuban problem.’ It is they argue (1996: 
372) “through the discourse of ‘the Cuban problem,’ [that] the United States has 
constructed and continues to construct particular and contestable identities both for 
itself and for Cuba, and it is these identities that render aggressive US policies 
towards Cuba sensible, and sometimes even (apparently) necessary.” Similarly, K.M. 
Fierke (1996) demonstrates how a particular framing of the Bosnian crisis within a 
language game constituted Western (in)action. The act of naming the game 
constitutes the meaning of the particular movement within that game. That is, when 
the situation is defined within the Munich analogy, peacekeeping efforts of the West 
are characterized as appeasement of aggressor Serbs to continue thek ethnic 
cleansing; or when it is defined within the Vietnam analogy, the deployment of 
American ground troops in Bosnia is hindered.
3.6. CONSTRUCTING ALLIANCE AND SECURITY DILEMMA
The traditional approaches to alliances and security dilemmas in international politics 
are realism, and liberalism. States form alliances to balance against capabilities 
(balance of power theory of either classical or neo-realism), the uncertainty of others’ 
intentions and the fear of insecurity produces security dilemmas (third image or 
structural realism). Liberalism transcends troubled alliances and security dilemmas.
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However, the inherent materialism in (neo)realism and rationalism in (neo)Iiberalism 
is problematic from a constructivist perspective.
However, recent attempts to revitalize the issues in the realist camp such as Walt’s 
The Origins of Alliances says that states balance not against power but rather against 
threats. And, the threat is derived not solely from the logic of anarchy but from 
geostrategic considerations, military factors and aggressive intentions. In Robert 
Jervis’ Perception and Misperception in International Politics, the security dilemma 
is the result of actors’ (mis)perceptions as to the others’ intentions. The utilization of 
intentions and perceptions to understand exactly what constitutes a threat is in fact a 
clear sign of constructivist inclination. Nevertheless, Barnett (1996: 403) notes that 
'‘the commitment to materialism, however, forces Walt to reduce ideational factors to 
the level of ideology and to see them as parasitic on the material.”
The balance of threat approach to alliance formation and the deterrence theory 
approach to the security dilemma can be fruitful if they are reconceptualized through 
constructivist assumptions. Thi’eats are socially constructed and identities are the 
basis of interests. In contrast to realism, constructivism assumes that threats are not 
derivative of the distribution of capabilities, but derivative of the distribution of 
knowledge. Threats are social constructions. As Keith Krause (1998: 306, 309) notes 
“the world of threats and intentions is supremely a constructed one, involving 
history, culture, communication ideologies and related factors” and so “the question 
of how the object of security itself is constructed is inextricable from the discourse of 
threats.” It is these socially constructed threats that are for the most part constitutive 
of the interests to be secured or pursued. Moreover, the constructivist perspective
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argues that state identity offers valuable insights for the study of state alliances. 
Identity politics which determine which states pose a threat or not shape the choices 
of possible alliance partners. It is in fact the shared identity that makes some partners 
for alliance more attractive and possible than others. From this perspective, the bases 
of alliances are the mutual identification and cognitive affinity that is promoted by 
collective identity. The alliance here takes some form of community rather than a 
contractual type, the basis of which is composed of mutual promises. Therefore, 
alliances survive as long as the collective identity remains as it is and the actors act 
in accordance with the normative structure the mutual interaction produced. In fact, 
the nature and the degree of cohesiveness of alliances are measured against the 
yardstick of identity—how much the actors in question mutually identify themselves 
with each other—which determines the maintenance of alliance. In this sense, 
alliances cease when the parties undergo serious identity crises, or role conflicts or 
are in a position of responding to competing identities.
As to the security dilemumas, worst-case scenarios, which are the sources of threat 
perceptions leading to deterrent practices, are not the result of anarchy, but of a 
competitive security environment, which is socially constructed. State behavior is 
determined by actors’ conceptions of their identities, which are relationally 
constructed with a view to others’ identity conceptions. As Wendt (1992: 397) puts it 
“States act differently towards enemies than they do friends because enemies are 
threatening and friends are not.” State behavior is the product of interstate 
interactions. In fact, ‘"History matters. Security dilemmas are not the acts of God. 
They are effects of practice (Wendt, 1995:77).”
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Michael Barnett (1996) demonstrates that how the shared identity and interests 
among Ai'ab states during the Cold War—Arabism (pan-Arab identity)—created an 
Arab state system and helped the construction of threat, namely the presence of Israel 
and the intrusion of Western Powers particularly the US in the region. The normative 
structure of this system had thus put much pressure on Iraq—an Arab state—for 
being allied by the Baghdad pact with Turkey—a member state of the West and the 
successor of the Ottoman Empire. However, the end of the Cold War, the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, the Gulf War and the peace process between Israel and the 
Palestinian representatives promoted identity changes—the weakening of Arab 
nationalism and the rise of state sovereignty—which in turn shaped the new security 
and alliance formations in the region. It made possible the construction of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council and the intrusion of the US in the region.
Many of domestic and regional practices that led to the consolidation of sovereignty 
promoted a sovereign compatible interpretation of Arab nationalism. Those 
dynamics promoted the development of new state identities, roles, and interests, 
which in turn facilitated the emergence of relatively stable expectations and shared 
norms that are associated with sovereignty. As a result, identity politics determined 
the nature of interaction among the Arab states and transformed Ai'ab states from a 
troubled alliance to the regional order based on the new state sovereign normative 
structure (Barnett, 1995).
This chapter has outlined the basics of constructivism and established a framework 
for foreign and security policies in terms of identity politics and strategic culture, it 
was argued that the security relations between the actors—states—vary under 
anarchy because of identity and interest formation and security (threat) constructions.
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State preferences are basically derived from domestic strategic culture and also 
endogenous to interstate interaction. Therefore, alliances and security dilemmas are 
social constructions with a view to identity and interest formation and security 
construction.
The next chapter will take these arguments and apply them to Turkish-Greek and 
Turkish Israeli-re latió ns in the post-Co Id War era. It examines to what extent identity 
politics and strategic culture play a role in the formulation and execution of foreign 
and security policies of Turkey vis-à-vis Greece and Israel. The Turkish-Israeli 
alliance and the security dilemma between Turkey and Greece are hypothesized as 
social constructions with regard to how identity and interest is formed and security is 
produced.
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CHAPTER 4:
TURKISH-ISRAELI AND TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS
4.1. IDENTITY AND TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
Identity politics have dkect and indirect impacts on states’ foreign and security 
policies. Identity either determines the national interests because identity and interest 
formation are tied to each other or identity gives a direction to foreign policy or 
specifies the goals to be pursued. Turkey, as a case in point, has vital identity 
questions reflected in its foreign affairs. The identity attributed to the Turkish 
Republic constitutes the underlying base upon which Turkish foreign policy (TFP) 
operates.
Although Turkish national identity has emerged in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, a form of Turkish identity amalgamated with Islam was present as 
the Other’ of European identity much earlier (Yurdusev, 1997a: 101; Neumann and 
Welsh, 1991). This identity and its most intrinsic component of Islam were perceived 
as the objects of enmity for Europeans. Turkish and European identities were 
constructed in a self-other dichotomy in which each of them defined itself in relation 
to its other. This also gave rise to negative identification between Turks and 
Europeans (Yurdusev, 1997b). This identity formation determined the nature of 
relations between Europeans and the Ottoman Empire. Identity questions emerged in 
the late times of the Ottoman Empire as to whether Ottoman, pan-Islamist or Pan- 
Turanist identities should be followed (Akgura, 1994). The founder of the Republic, 
Mustafa Kemal, and the state elite basically defined the identity of Turkish republic 
on the basis of a secular-national identity (Bilgin, 1998) which represents an attempt
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to resolve the problématique of identity seeking. Kemalism. is a ‘modernity project,’ 
committed to the construction of a nation-state, and a new national identity for 
Turkey, out of a multi-national Empire based on the principles of secularism and 
rationalism (Keyman and İçduygu, 1998: 170-71). As the Ottoman polity has 
multiple identities, the mission of creating a new and encompassing national identity 
based on constitutional rights and territorial boundaries was very difficult (Somel, 
1997). For this reason, Kemalist Republican national identity did not provide much 
space for sub-identities (Özbudun, 1997: 158). Since an identity is defined by 
representing or constructing its ‘other’ in relational terms, this new Turkish national 
identity had no external ‘other’. However, the ‘other’ signifier of Turkish identity 
was internal to Turkey’s socio-historical reality. This was old Turkey, that is 
Ottoman; the religious world-view prevalent in the older civilization (Bora, 1997: 
58). Thus, Turkish national identity has a ‘manufactured character’ and ‘Turks were 
a ‘made’ nation by virtue of emphasizing their difference from the Ottomans’ as 
articulated by Ayşe Kadıoğlu (1995:188). This new identity formation, that is to say, 
the transition from Ottoman to Turkish identity, had an impact upon foreign policy. 
As Selim Deringil (1992:1) has noted “The basic problematic of republican Turkish 
foreign policy has always been readjustment to secondary power status from an 
imperial past.’’ The Turkish republic has acquired a new identity, the bases of which 
are no longer religion, a dynasty, expansionism or a multinational character. Rather 
the new Turkish nation-state was constructed in line with the modern nation states of 
the West based on secular nationalism. Consequently, it is this western, national, 
secular and pacific identity that makes the new Turkish Republic to assume the role 
of a status quo power unlike the defeated powers of the First World War which 
became revisionist states in the interwar period. It is hardly surprising that Turkey
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did not follow a policy of irredentism or expansionism even though there appeared 
many instances and opportunities to be exploited.
In the interwar years, the low level of positive identification with Europe has not 
made it possible for Turkey to follow close relations with European powers (Ülman, 
1968: 244-56). Turkey pursued a ,policy of neutrality during the Second World War 
(Deringil, 1994; Ataöv, 1965). The Cold War period, however, provided material 
conditions—the bipolar structure of the international system and the Soviet territorial 
demands from Turkey—for Turkey and the Western powers to develop a higher level 
of identification. Turkey declared war against Germany and thus became a founding 
member of the United Nations. That was followed Turkey’s entry into NATO in 
1952, a collective identity institution of the Western world. In this structure, 
Turkey’s interests have been moulded and are always in the process of definition 
(Bağcı, 1990; Turan and Barlas, 1994). Turkey became the staunch ally of the 
western world and by way of accession to the western structures, Turkey adopted the 
western norms, such as democracy, as part of its new identity—Turkey shifted from 
a one-party pohtical system to a multiparty political system in 1950, two years before 
it joined NATO. Turkey did this because democracy is part of its identity defined 
through its relation to the western world as a member of NATO alliance. NATO, for 
the Turkish governing elite, was not just a strategic alliance or a collective defence 
organization; rather, it is an important part of the Turkish Westernization project—a 
process of identity formation—and an embodiment of Turkey’s new identity, 
Europeanness. The identity of the Turkish Republic in committing itself to the 
ultimate goal of westernization and/or modernization, has always been a background 
determinant of Turkish foreign policy (Sander, 1993). In this regard, Turkey has
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always strove to be member of European institutions and to win acceptance as 
European. This urge compels Turkey to pursue a policy in line with European 
powers. Turkey gets credit for its posture of being a staunch ally of the western 
world and acting accordingly with and within the European and international 
institutions and refraining from unilateral initiatives. As Turkish President Süleyman 
Demirel (1994) stated, “The maintenance of this image is one of the top priorities of 
foreign policies.”
The 1960’s demonstrate a change on TFP. The dismantling of the Jupiter missiles in 
Turkey without consulting Turkish officials during the 1962 Cuba crisis; the Cyprus 
problem and Johnson’s letter warning Turkey not to take unilateral initiatives in 
Cyprus, and decreasing economic aid all worsened Turkey’s relations with the 
western world. These developments opened an identity debate at home. The 
unfriendly responses of western powers to Turkey generated some resentment at the 
societal level and the high level of collective identification with the ’Western world 
was questioned. As a result, the changing configuration of Turkish national identity 
affected foreign policy patterns so that Turkey began to diversify its foreign policy. 
The beginning of détente as well helped Turkey pursue a more independent foreign 
policy resulting in rapprochement with the Soviet Union and a more favourable 
approach to the Arab-Islamic world. In this.period, Turkey became a member of 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).
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4.1.1. TURKEY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: SEARCH FOR IDENTITY
The identity question or crisis has gained a new momentum in the post-Cold War era 
in Turkey (Abramowitz, 1993: 169). It was described as the opening of a ‘Kemalist 
pandora’s box’ which was sealed in 1923, when the Turkish republic was founded 
(Kadıoğlu, 1995; Müftüler-Baç, 1996). Out of the multiple identities which emerged, 
two of them, the Islamic and Kurdish identities became internationally propagated 
and gained firm ground in these discussions. The established Kemalist identity and 
its western orientation have been seriously challenged. This identity crisis as well 
reflected in foreign policy as described as a ‘search for identity’ (Dağı, 1993; Öniş, 
1995). In the post-Cold War era, Turkey’s national identity faced fundamental 
challenges. Three developments in the early 1990’s in general resulted in this 
change: Turkey’s rejection by the European Community in response to its full 
membership application in December 1989; the emergence of new foreign policy 
alternatives with the independence of former Soviet Turkic Republics; and the 
inability of western powers (particularly European) to handle the Bosnian as well as 
the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis (Dağı, 1993; 60). Domestic socio-economic and 
political developments also contributed to the new identity-defining debate that has 
affected the foreign policy of Turkey. The repressed components of Turkish national 
identity—Turkic, Ottoman, Islamic—began to resurface (Yeni Türkiye, 1995: 33). 
The roles attributed to Turkey and its foreign policy as ‘active foreign policy’, 
‘Turkish role-model’, ‘regional power’, ‘leadership in the Turkic world’, ‘Neo- 
Ottomanism’, “Mediterranean and Black Sea powers’ are much bounded with its 
identity question. (Çandar, 30/08/1997; Dağı, 1993; Makovsky, 1999; Yavuz, 1998; 
Naveh, 1994; Türkiye Günlüğü, 1992: 19; Fuller and Lesser, 1993).
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This narrative of TFP demonstrates that the formulation of national interests and 
foreign policies is very much bounded with how identity is constructed. From this 
perspective, national interests are not pre-given or fixed as realists would assume but 
ai’e social constructions. As such, identity is also a social construction. Identity is not 
simply an ideology, which has a dogmatic character. The distinction between identity 
and interest is meaningless as realists make it, such as national interests versus 
ideology (Aykan, 1988). Secondly, Turkey’s national identity is not monolithic. Its 
multiple identities reflect its institutional affiliation. For instance, NATO is the 
embodiment of its European identity; on the other hand, OIC is an institution of its 
Islamic identity. It is a founder of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone and 
participates in Turkic World leaders summits'every year. It is unique for Turkey to 
have so many multiple and contrasting identities.
In the post-Co Id War era, the Central Asian Turkic Republics gained their 
independence and Turkish minorities in the Balkans have slipped away from 
Communist governments. The historical and cultural legacies of Turks have been 
revived and gained a new vitality. New vast areas of influence and potential 
cooperation emerged for Turkey. Turkey was supposed to be a regional power with 
the opening of large areas of influence (Fuller, 1993a). Some quarters both at home 
and abroad argued for an imminent Turkish century, presuming a greater role for 
Turkey in international affairs (Fuller, 1993b). AU of these foreign policy 
orientations related to the identity debates obviously have challenged with the well- 
established identity of Turkish state and its foreign policy manifesto. However, the 
fundamental approach of foreign policy has changed slightly (Kirişçi, 1993; Kut, 
1998; Oran, 1996). It is no longer inner-directed, nor holds a narrow perspective.
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Apart from strategic, security considerations, economic, historical, and cultural 
factors have gained importance. In externalizing its policy, however, Turkey hardly 
ever turned to irredentism or expansionism, but rather played the role of intermediary 
and role-model for the newly independent countries (Sezer, 1996). This is because 
the strategic culture of Turkey is relatively stable defined largely by state and 
military elite rather than societal dynamics.
4.2. DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND STRATEGIC CULTURE
4.2.1. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND THE ROLE OF MILITARY
In Turkey, the military as an institution plays a significant role in matters that ai'e 
deemed within national security and interest. This significance comes from largely 
both the institutional and legal arrangements of Turkish political culture.
Turkey’s case represents a ‘strong state’ (Heper, 1985) from its inception with a 
longer background of modernization or westernization history (Inalcik, 1964). The 
state and military were both the object and the subject of modernization, which 
foresees the top-down transformation of society in the western mould. Thus, the 
military was always at the center of domestic, as well as external politics. The 
Turkish domestic political culture has inherited much from the Ottoman polity 
(Mardin, 1969)—patrimonial bureaucracy, absence of civil society, cultural 
cleavages—but new Turkish Republic has been built on the new norms and values 
that are in contrast with the its predecessor. As Şerif Mardin (1971: 202) puts it “The 
Turkish revolution ... did not have as target the sweeping away of feudal privileges, 
but it did take as a target the values of the Ottoman ancien regime.'' The Turkish
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political, institutional and cultural structure is dominated by bureaucratic and military 
elites. Though they are loyal to democracy as a property of modernization, 
“[r]emaining true to its guardianship tradition, the military in Turkey has always 
permitted civilian rule, but kept it under tutelage by using intermittent, direct 
interventions whenever the party ‘logic’ departed from the spirit of the Atatürk 
revolution” (Heper, 1979/80: 103).
For instance, the Turkish military from the 1960s onwards intervened three times in 
domestic politics and returned to its barracks. These interventions exemplify the 
dhect influence of the military in domestic and foreign policies. The indirect 
influence appears through its institutional supremacy, legal and constitutional 
powers. The military in recent years have not been exercising a dkect influence but 
they still asphe “to exercise independent political power particularly through the 
National Security Council.” (Heper and Güney, 1996: 620). As Ümit C. Sakallıoğlu 
(1997: 153) notes.
Since 1983 the military has used legal/constitutional, 
historical/cultural, and structural reasons and mechanisms to retain its 
privileged position in issuing demands, policy suggestions, and 
warnings on political matters. It has done so at the expense of 
nonmilitary groups, such as the left, youth, the retired, women, the 
unemployed, and intellectuals, whose views carry less weight.
The nature of civil-military relations results in two implications: first, the military’s 
acceptance of civilian authority has made it necessary to disguise its political weight 
or to legitimize its overt interventions. For this reason, the military has gradually 
expanded its institutional functions and acquired legal and constitutional powers. 
Second, the military as an institution is seen as being above politics, and politically 
autonomous. The military has such a posture because “the ultimate justification for
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the military’s political predominance rests on its ‘guai’dianship of the national 
interest,’ of which maintaining national unity is considered to be the most important 
component” (Sakallioglu, 1997:154).
The state-society relationship is another dimension of the domestic institutional 
structure. The distance between state and society and the dominance of the former 
over the latter makes Turkey a ‘statist’ state in which elites rather than societal 
dynamics have much weight in the formulation of national security policies and 
strategies. The nature of this relationship determines the extent to which state 
interests come first when compai’ed to societal interests.
Both civil-military and state-society relations determine the parameters of the 
political culture in Turkey that provides much space for the military to influence 
domestic and foreign policies. In addition to the failure of civilians to curb the vast 
powers of the military, they even encourage or invite it to take a high profile when 
cultural cleavages, extremist rightist and leftist movements, and sectaidanism take 
hold. Since its last intervention in 1980 and its three-year stay in power, the military 
has chosen to pursue indirect influence through devising a new constitution, the 1982 
Constitution, and institutional arrangements, (Ozcan, 1994; 1998) such as National 
Security Council.'
‘ In Turkey, for national security matters, first the General Secretariat of the Supreme Defense 
Assembly was formed by decree in 1933. This Assembly was responsible from national mobilization 
issues. The role of this institution was expanded to cover the preparation of national defense policy 
with an Act in 1949. Later on, the National Security Council (NSC) was transformed into a 
constitutional institution by the 1961 Constitution. The Act on NSC No 129, passed on December 11, 
1962 envisaged the establishment of the NSC and the general Secretariat. The Council was also tasked 
with determining the principles of domestic, foreign and defense policies. The NSC currently in force 
was organized under the 1982 Constitution. The NSC and the General Secretariat were established 
under the Act dated November 9,1983 and No.2945. According to the Constitution the NSC consists 
of the following members under the chairmanship of the President: Prime Minister, Chief of General 
Staff, Minister of National Defense, Minister of Interior Affairs, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
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The organizational culture of the military affects its approach to the formulation and 
execution of security policies because the military is the most influential institution, 
has strong hierarchy and is a ‘total institution’ in complete isolation from political 
elites and social groups (Birand, 1986: 146). Fii'st, the military is committed to 
westernization and modernization. Second, it sees itself as the natural guardian of 
Atatürk’s principles—the secular nation-state, territorial integrity, and national unity.
Strategic culture is much related with the political culture and the organizational 
culture of the particular military in any country. The military as an institution is very 
much active and distinct in Turkish political culture as reflected in the several 
interventions of the military into domestic politics. This political culture also 
provides the ground for the military to operate vigorously, particularly in national 
security matters. Therefore, the military is a distinct participant not only in the 
decision making process but also in the implementation of Turkish foreign policy.
4.2.2. STRATEGIC CULTURE AND THE BASICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
POLICY
National security is defined in the Act on the ‘National Security Council and 
National Security Council General Secretariat’ dated December 9'*’ 1983 No. 2945 as 
“the protection and maintenance of the state’s constitutional order, national presence, 
integrity, all political, social, cultural and economic interests on an international 
level, and contractual law against any kind of internal and foreign threat” (White 
paper: Defense, 1998: 12). The same Act describes National Security Policy as “a
Commander of Land Forces, Commander of Naval Forces, Commander of Air Forces and General 
Commander of Gendarmerie. (White Paper: Defense, 1998: 9-10).
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policy covering the principles of the internal, foreign and defense patterns of 
behavior determined by the Board of Ministers within the views set by the National 
Security Council with the aim of ensuring national security and achieving national 
objectives” (White Paper: Defense, 1998: 12-13).
Thus, the spectrum of national security is wide-ranging and includes many sectors of 
security (Ozcan, 1994, 1998). It has both external and internal aspects. Territorial 
integrity, non-interference in domestic affairs, and indivisibility of the country ai'e 
some of the most important preferences of external security. On the other hand, 
seculai'ism, constitutional order, and national unity constitute the basic pillars of 
internal security.^ (Davison, 1953: 172, 180; Karpat, 1996: 1).
Turkey’s defense policy is oriented to ‘defensive realpolitik' and it has been 
identified with the aim of maintaining and preserving the country’s independence, 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and its vital interests. To achieve those security 
objectives and to carry out its defensive realpolitik, Turkey’s military strategy 
consists of four dimensions (White Paper: Defense, 1998: 15):
1. Deterrence: Turkey relies on its military power to forestall potential aggressors 
from taking offensive measures against itself and to prevent possible threats.
2. Collective Security and Alliance Politics: Turkey actively involves itself in 
bilateral and multilateral alliances and gives special importance to regional and 
international institutions of which it is a part. For instance, NATO is the
■ Article No. 5 of the 1982 Constitution states that: ‘The state’s main objectives and obligations are to 
protect and maintain the independence and integrity of the Turkish nation, the indivisibility of the 
country, the republic and the democracy to ensure the prosperity, peace and happiness of the 
individuals and society.” Article No. 24 states that; “No one can exploit or misuse religion, religious 
feelings or things considered religious in whatever form or amount with the aim of making the basic 
social, economic, political or legal order of the state dependent on religious rules for political or
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backbone of Turkey’s security strategies and policies; the special bilateral 
relation with the US also constitutes an important part of Turkey’s strategic 
planning.
3. Forward defense: it is to identify the potential conflicts and threats and to take 
preemptive measures to forestall or to eliminate them without resulting in actual 
armed clashes.
4. Military contribution to the crisis management and intervention during crises: 
Turkey never rules out the option of threatening to use force to ease the tensions 
and to resolve stalemates in favor of itself. For this reason, Turkey always keeps 
its armed forces ready, well-trained, and modernized to deploy or mobilize 
whenever necessary.
Out of such a portrayal of Turkish national security strategy, it can be argued that 
Turkish strategic culture falls into the mixture of accommodationist and 
defensive grand strategies arising out of its political goal of status quo. 
Accordingly, Turkey’s strategic culture can be schematised as follows:
ersonal interests or to exert influence.”
Alastair Iain Johnston (1995b: 112-13) proposes three ideal types of grand strategies: 
accommodationist, defensive and offensive/expansionist. Accommodationist strategy “relies primarily 
on diplomacy, political trading, economic incentives, bandwagoning, and balancing alliance behavior, 
among other low-coercion policies. Security is achieved primarily through informal and formal 
alliance building, or uni-, bi-, or multilateral concessions. Accommodationist strategies imply that the 
ends of policy, while not necessarily well defined, exclude the physical and political elimination of the 
adversary and the annexation of its territory.” Defensive strategy “is more coercive in nature than an 
accommodationist strategy. It relies primarily on static defense along an external boundary. The use of 
force is not designed to annex territory or to destroy the political leadership or structures of the enemy 
state. Security is supplied primarily through the internal mobilization of resources for military 
purposes rather than through alliance building. Defensive grand strategies imply that the ends of 
policy are not, at that moment, expansionist or annexationist. This category captures the notion of 
deterrence through denial or limited punishment.”
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Political Goal Grand Strategy Military Doctrine Strategy
Status quo
Defensive
Accommodationist
► . Deterrence
Defensive
Limited Aims
-► Attrition
(Johnston, 1995b: 115)
Turkey, in order to achieve its national interests and to alleviate security concerns, 
either enters into bilateral or multilateral alliances (Tamkog, 1961); or relies on its 
own national resources. Turkey thus is a staunch member of NATO, an associate 
member of WEU, and a full member of the OSCE. It has special bilateral relations 
with the US particularly in security matters. In the case of Soviet threat, Turkey 
found its security under the umbrella of NATO, whereas Turkey relies on its own 
capabilities against Greece.
The major texts on foreign and security affairs in Turkey also have realpolitik 
perpectives and are state-centered (Sezer, 1981; Gonlübol and et al., 1996). State 
security has priority over all other concerns. Consequently, policy-makers adopt 
realist security axioms. The Turkish state and military elite puts much emphasis on 
balance of power considerations and geopolitical calculations.
Turkey as a status quo power is not offensive or expansionist in its relations. It 
exploits all diplomatic channels and means but still thinks of the use of force as the 
last resort of diplomacy. It increases its military hardware for defensive and 
deterrence purposes but when necessary it does not eschew from making use of 
them, however rare is it—a case of Cyprus in 1974 and Northern Iraq operations in 
the post-Gulf War period. Both territorial sovereignty and national sovereignty which
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is the sine qua non for its national identity are highly valued to be secured against not 
only external but also internal threats.
Turkey’s foreign policy is constructed on the maxim of Kemal Atatürk ‘peace at 
home, peace in the world.’ Though it is doubtful whether such a statement was made 
by Atatürk himself (Gönlübol and Sar, 1963: 90 in note 86; see also Gönlübol, 1961: 
211 in note 3) the state and security elite internalized this dictum. This led to a 
cautious foreign policy orientation which is now challenged by the ones who support 
more activist policies (Mufti, 1998). Ironically, this phrase should not be thought that 
peace oriented policy is necessarily to be altruistic and always passive. For Turkey’s 
military elite, peace comes with deterrence and balance. Military might is therefore 
at the core Turkey’s quest for peace and stability. Consequently, the Turkish military 
presupposes that the peace and security is best served^ with Turkey’s deterrence 
ability and its credible demonstration of force.
4.2.3. TURKEY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: SEARCH FOR SECURITY
Most studies on Turkish foreign and security policies in the post-Cold War era 
emphasize the impact of the changing international structure. The disappearance of 
the Soviet and/or Communist menace for Turkey’s territorial integrity and Western, 
democratic, liberal identity has absolutely significant implications for Turkish 
national security and strategy. However, new threat perceptions have ascended as the 
Cold War’s stability and certainty gave way to uncertainty and instability, ethnic- 
clashes, terrorist activities, and refugee floods. The Gulf-War of 1990-91, the 
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Chechen-Russian
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conflict, and the Bosnian crisis among others, have all, one way or another, had 
negative effects on Turkey’s security. The immediate aftermath of the Cold War 
presented uncertainty, instability and fluidity that Turkey had to respond to 
effectively and to eliminate. In short, the Soviet threat has waned but new threats 
emerged in Turkey’s neai' environment in which Greece, Syria and Iraq appeared as 
the most threatening states for Turkey’s national security (Sezer, 1992). Turkey’s 
role became a frontline state in the intersection of conflicting regions of the Middle 
East, the Balkans, and the Trans-Caucauses instead of a flank country of NATO 
during the Cold War. Despite all these changes, Turkey’s security objectives remain 
significantly the same: to protect the independence, freedom and integrity of the 
country, maintain the constitutional order and its principles, promote the economy 
and welfai’e of the nation, develop friendly relations with other countries and create 
an environment of peace and stability around Turkey (Çakar·, 1996: 20).
4.3. TURKEY IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
The Gulf crisis was the hai’binger of the end of the Cold War in the Middle East. 
Turkey took a high profile in the crisis on behalf of the Western coalition against 
Iraq. Turgut Özal, the prime minister at the time, closed the Iraqi oil pipeline which 
is the primary means of Iraqi oil exports to the world. Turkey deployed its forces on 
the Iraqi border, permitted its military bases to be used for air operations against Iraq 
and joined the economic embargo against Iraq. This active involvement created 
repercussions in domestic politics. State eûtes had accused Özal of diverting 
Turkey’s traditional diplomacy by pursuing an adventurist policy that would be
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harmful for Turkey’s interests. That also resulted in the resignation of Foreign 
Minister, Ali Bozer and General Chief of Staff, Necip Torumtay.
The threat construction from Middle East has become so immense that Turkey had to 
give up its traditional non-or minimum involvement in the Middle Eastern politics 
for its own sake (Makovsky, 1999; Altunışık, 1998; Sayari, 1997). For Turkey’s part, 
the main threatening environment was not the Gulf crisis itself but the environment 
of instability and uncertainty that it left afterwards. These became the major security 
concerns and constituted the threat constructions of the state and military elite. For 
example, the power vacuum created in Northern Iraq where the majority of the 
population is of Kurdish origin constituted a great threat for Turkey (Kirişçi, 1996; 
Olson, 1995). The Turkish military broke its traditional approach of caution, and 
crossed the Iraqi border for border-beyond operations against the PKK to make the 
region safe from terrorist shelter. That also enhanced the status of Turkish General 
Chief of Staff in the security and foreign policy making processes (S. Güvenç, 1998). 
In this period, the Turkish elite saw an internal religious uprising and a Kurdish 
ethnic revival engendered by some Middle Eastern neighbouring states. However, as 
Turkey became more active in regional politics, “it brought various tendencies in 
Turkey out of closet, thereby threatening the officially defined identity of the Turkish 
state’’ (Müftüler-Baç, 1996; 265).
As the biggest threat from the North—the Soviet Union—in the post-Cold War era 
has ceased to exist, the governing elite in Turkey has vociferously began to talk 
about new threats coming particularly from the Middle East. This security discourse 
has shaped Turkey’s Middle East politics in general, and relations with Israel in
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particular. The active involvement of Turkey in regional politics has been shaped by 
several factors. However, the density and style of this engagement has in large part 
been determined by the identity debate and by strategic culture in Turkey.
4.3.1. IDENTITY POLITICS IN TURKISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS
Turkey’s approach to Israel in the second half of the I990’s reveals an inextricable 
part of the domestic identity debate in Turkey. As the regional and international 
factors have contributed to the development of cordial relations between the two 
countries in the aftermath of the Cold War, the strategic alignment in the second half 
of the 1990’s demonstrates the link between domestic identity politics and alliance 
(Altunışık, 1998).
The most defining dimension of Turkish State identity is its republican secular 
nationalist identity that is based upon the Kemalist principles formulated by Atatürk 
himself. This identity of the state has been challenged in the post-Cold War era and 
became acute when the Islamic Welfare party came to power in 1996 (Dağı, 1998). 
Both the Kurdish identity and the Islamic identity have become serious challengers 
to the established Kemalist state identity (Sakallıoğlu, 1996; Öniş, 1997; S. Ayata, 
1996; White, 1995; A. Ayata, 1998; B. Güvenç, 1998; Helvacıoğlu, 1996). The 
identity debate in the domestic polity has had ramifications in the external relations 
as well. Turkey’s established state and military elite who see themselves as the 
guardians of Western, secular national state identity perceived this as a threat to 
Turkey’s established identity and its national unity. These became the most valued
.- 95
objects to be secured. Turkish state identity thus became a security object. As it was
argued that:
As a result of Islamic revivalism—by the mid-1990’s taking the form 
of electoral threat with the rise of the Refah party—and the 
development of and expansion of the Kurdish problem, Turkey’s 
domestic and foreign policies became increasingly governed by a 
sense of insecurity. A ‘security-first state’ has evolved ... the sense of 
siege and doom was exacerbated as their mission to become part of 
the West was cruelly halted by what was perceived as the 
determination of the European Union (EU) to exclude ‘Muslim 
Turkey’ while it contemplated the admission of former Warsaw Pact 
adversaries such as Poland, Hungary [and Czech republic] and even 
potentially Romania and Bulgaria. It was against this background that 
the military has sought to overcome this domestic insecurity and 
Turkey’s isolation within the western world through the new alliance 
with Israel. (Yavuz, 1997: 27-28).
Apart from domestic identity concerns, the similar identity configuration of both 
states brought them together. The identity issue determines the range of states with 
which Turkey can have strategic long-term relations. Turkey’s secular, pro-western, 
US-allied and democratic identities arising out of its domestic definition makes it an 
unlikely partner for the Ai'ab, anti-American, authoritarian and rogue states of the 
region. As Israel looks to be the natural partner, the relationship is being cemented as 
‘one of the Middle East’s most serious geopolitical axes’ (Economist, 9/19/1998). 
Having maintained working relations since the inception of the Israeli State in 1948, 
Turkey began to have cooperative relations openly with Israel following Israel’s 
peace agreement with the PLO in September 1993.
Moreover, Turkish involvement in Middle Eastern politics would not hamper its 
‘western self-image’ if Turkey allies with Israel in the region. As Alan Makovsky 
(1996: 170) argues, ‘Turkey’s relations with Israel square comfortably with its 
western self-image and European integration efforts. In some ways, partnership with
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Israel allows Turkey to pursue a Middle East-focused policy, should it choose, 
without cost to its image in the West.” Israel represents a cognitive part of the 
western world and it is seen a de facto member of NATO thi'ough its organic 
relationship with the US. The nature of relationship is based not just on military 
technical-training, modernization and intelligence agreements developed out of 
common interests but on deeper shared understandings. Both Turkey and Israel are 
the only countries in this volatile region which are staunch allies of the US, pro- 
Western, committed to democracy and western, secular values and share common 
views and attitudes as anti-terrorist and anti-radical Islamic activities (Pipes, 
1997/98; Pipes, 1998). Makovsky (1996), for these reasons, sees the prospect of this 
relationship as bright and promising for the simple reason that the fundamental bases 
of this relationship are at work. Even if the common thi'eats and interests disappear, 
this alliance would not wane easily contrary to what realists expect because both 
states see themselves as natural allies and positively identify themselves with each 
other. These two states apart from common western, democratic and secular 
identities, also share a ‘common sense of otherness’ (Makovsky, 1996: 169) or ‘a 
sense of alienation’ (Waxman 1998: 30) in a Middle East populated by Arabs and 
non-democratic states.
Another aspect of the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement is the formation of a new 
structure of identities and interests in the region. Though far from demonstrating 
security community characteristics (Aykan, 1999: 22), it can lay the foundations for 
that to happen. The allies on that account frequently announce that this initiative is 
not against any third party. They even invited Jordan and Egypt for the search and 
rescue operation held by Turkey, Israel and the US in the Mediterranean. As
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Makovsky (1996: 170) argued, “Turkey and Israel together could form the backbone 
of a moderate, pro-US consensus in the region—along with such states as Morocco, 
Tunusia, Jordan, Egypt, and some of the Gulf states—for diplomatic and eventually 
for security purposes.” As Former Israeli air force general David Ivri says that “the 
logic of Turkish-Israeli military, economic and technological ties is greater than 
Islamic solidarity or European clubbiness. Common threats create mutual interests, 
and growing trust develops comrades in more than arms” (Safire, 11/12/1997).
4.3.2. STRATEGIC CULTURE AND THE TURKISH-ISRAELI 
RAPPROACHEMENT
In the post-Cold War era, the new political and security environment in the Middle 
East encouraged Turkey to take a high profile in Middle Eastern politics and to have 
close ties with Israel (Sayari, 1997: 44). The initial sign of this improvement in 
Turkey’s relations was the raising of diplomatic ties with both Israel and the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to ambassadorial level in December 1991. 
Economic relations have flourished and the number of Israeli tourists coming to 
Turkey has increased substantially. In addition to these positive developments, 
cultural and educational relations gained speed as well.
The beginning of the Israel-PLO peace process allowed Turkey to establish more 
open and direct relations with Israel (Lochery, 1998: 47). Second, Turkey was 
increasingly dissatisfied with the minimal diplomatic support for its Cyprus question 
in the international arena and the economic dividends the Arab world provided for 
Turkey in recent years. Finally, by the end of the Cold War, Turkey redefined its
98
security environment and contemplated to what extent NATO would provide a 
security guarantee against potential Middle Eastern threats (Elekdag, 1996: 54). All 
of these concerns from Turkey’s part made an alliance with Israel possible and even 
necessary.
Turkey’s relations with Israel are multi-dimensional in character (Pipes, 1997/98: 
Lochery, 1998). Economic ties constitute an important part of this relationship. 
Several agreements were signed in this context. Another area to be fostered is 
tourism. A cooperation agreement on tourism was signed in June 1992. The most 
important part of Turkish-Israeli rapprochement, however, is security cooperation, 
which has several aspects. The Military Training Cooperation Agreement was signed 
in 21-23 February 1996. This agreement foresees the exchange of information in 
military training, exchange of visits between militai'y academies, joint training, port 
visits, and exchanges between military archives. It also provides for the right of air 
powers to fly training missions over each other’s air space. The second agreement, 
which was signed on 26 August 1996, was on the cooperation in defense industries. 
According to this treaty, the parties agree on technology transfer and training of 
technicians and researchers. Furthermore, both parties are called upon to share 
intelligence and hold regular meetings between their security elites in order to 
evaluate regional threats and terrorism. This agreement also foresaw the joint naval 
operation, including the US, named Operation Reliant Mermaid. This was realised as 
a search and rescue operation in which Jordan participated as an observer. The 
military deals also constitute another dimension of security cooperation. For that 
matter, the two countries signed an agreement to modernize 54 of Turkey’s F-4 
Phantom aircraft for 650 billion dollars on 5 December 1996. Israel and Turkey
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agreed to produce The Popeye II air-to-ground missiles with more advanced 
technology. 50 Popeye I missiles for F-4 fighters have been bought. The 
modernization program of the Turkish Armed Forces is supposed to continue with 
Israel in other hardwares, such as tanks and other aircrafts.
In Turkey, on April 29, 1997 the Turkish general chief of staff announced in a 
briefing the change in Turkish threat perception which constitutes the core of the 
‘Concept of National Military Strategy’ (Ozkaya, 22/05/1997; Çandar, 4/05/1997; 
see also B. Ülman, 1998). According to that, the external threat is being preceded by 
internal one which is explicated as ‘separatism’—Kurdish guerilla attacks to 
Turkey’s national unity and territorial integrity—and ‘regressive forces’ which are 
Islamic in character. These threats are fuelled by neighboring countries, mainly Syria 
and Iran. Syria shelters the PKK—a Kurdish military sepai'atist movement and a 
ten'orist organization—in its territories and thus carries out a covert war against 
Turkey. Iran supports Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey. Therefore, in line with this 
threat perception. Middle East became a strategic priority and at this juncture Israel 
gained a new meaning for the Turkish State and military elite. The rapprochement 
with Israel would be an antidote not only to Syria but also to Iran. Thus, at the center 
of this alliance stands particularly the Turkish military which thinks in geopolitical 
terms in general to balance these threats—not simply balance of power politics 
(Dibner, 1998/99; Waxman, 1998). Even when the Islamists in power, the deepening 
relations did not alter as reflected with the signing of further military co-operation 
agreement between the parties on 29 August 1996 (Lochery, 1998; 49).
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Turkish security and political elites’ perception of new threats and their redefinition 
of security environment regarding this region pushed Turkey to pursue a more 
independent foreign policy for preserving its most valued state identity and territorial 
integrity. That compelled Turkey to develop its relations to align itself with Israel at 
an unprecedented degree culminating ultimately in a strategic alliance. Turkey is no 
longer pursuing its delicate balancing policy between Arabs and Israeli state. It 
started openly to flirt with Israel disregarding the criticisms directed against itself by 
neighbouring Arab countries—Iraq and Syria—and Iran as well. Ankara even took 
the risk of being condemned in OIC for its such initiatives which are perceived as 
threats to Arab countries (New York Times, 11/12/1997; Morris, 1998).
4.4. TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS
4.4.1. CONSTRUCTING TURKISH AND GREEK NATIONAL IDENTITIES
Identity politics defines the parameters and the range of inter-state interactions. It 
also provides one with a lens to perceive the other with whom it is contrasted. 
However, identity is not something fixed but rather it is socially constructed. The 
construction is a process of interaction between ‘self and ‘other,’ as a result of 
which identities are constructed mutually and exclusively.
Turkish and Greek national identities to a large extent have been mutually and 
exclusively appropriated. The long-term interaction between these two entities 
created a social structure on which at least some dimensions of their identities were 
constructed with a view to each other. Vamik Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz (1994) 
successfully demonstrate the hostile ‘first encounter’ of Turks and Greeks in the
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Manzikert of Southeastern Anatolia in 1071 where Turks defeated the Byzantine 
forces. The crusades and the conquest of Constantinople by Turks represent other 
important points of encounter for the construction of Turkish and Greek identities. 
Later on, the Greek independence movements against the Ottomans, the invasion of 
Western Anatolia by the Greeks after First World War, Turkish independence 
movement which was fought in large part against Greeks and, lastly, the military 
conflict in Cyprus in 1974 all perpetuated the negative identification between Turks 
and Greeks.
In fact, the conflicting identities of Turks and Greeks are theh mutually exclusive
construction of national identities (Millas, 1995: 23-31). Hellenism as an identity of
Modern Greece was defined and imposed on Greeks by Europeans in return for help
in their independence movement. Greeks thus embraced an anti-Turkish construction
of Hellenic identity, which idealizes the Greek civilization as the source of western
civilization and defines Turks as barbaric and uncivilized (Yerasimos, 1988: 40). As
succintly put by Volkan and Itzkowitz (1994, 184);
Today the Megali Idea and Hellenism on the one hand, the 
psychology of the Greek people of remaining victims on the other 
hand are the unseen powers which are imbued with modern Greek 
group identity and they complicate political negotiations, create 
psychological resistance to solutions and made negotiations with the 
Turks difficult.
In fact, Hellenism necessitated the denial of oriental, barbaric and uncivilized 
identities of modern Greece and the projection of all those onto Turks. Such a 
dialectical identity construction is apparent that the identity of Turks is the ‘other’ of 
modern Greek identity.
Embodied in the Greek news media is the image of Turkey as the 
enemy par excellence. Turkey is described as a large, undemocratic.
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and aggressive power disrespectful of human rights. Turkey is 
inclined to torture and genocide and, is now, as in the past, barbaric 
and uncivilized. In short, Turkey is the source of aU evil in the world 
whereas the Greeks are characterized as being small, innocent, and 
victims who are brave and civilized Christians. (Volkan and 
Itzkowitz, 1994; 168).
The intrinsic component of Hellenic identity of Greece is the Megali Idea (Great 
Idea)."^  It aims at liberating Hellenic territories that are supposed under foreign 
occupation. Such a self (Greek) and other (Turk) definition of modern Greece puts a 
distance between Greeks and Turks and gives way to negative identification. 
Furthermore, the Megali Idea makes Greece iiTedentist country seeking to expand its 
teiTİtories at the expense of mainly Turkey until the Hellenic borders are realized.
Although the conflictual encounter during the Turkish War of Independence 
sharpened the Turkishness of the Turks, the endogenous transformation from 
Ottoman identity to new Turkish identity made it possible for the new Turkish 
republic to cease to identify itself negatively with Greece. It is this new identity that 
followed the peaceful period of interaction between Turkey and Greece under 
Atatürk and Venizelos culminating with a Friendship agreement in 1930. In this 
atmosphere, the problems had been solved in a friendly manner. In 1931, Greece 
unilaterally extended its airspace to ten miles off its coasts and in 1936, Greece 
extended its territorial waters from three to six nautical miles whereas Turkey did not 
attempt to extend its own territorial waters until after World War II. Those moves 
were neither perceived as threats, nor did they result in conflicts between the
■* Megali Idea is defined as “The Great Idea ... in midnineteenth century came to contain at least three 
different strands. Strictly incorporated it was the romantic dreams of revival of the Byzantine Empire 
centered on Constantinople. Less strictly, it was the aspirations for Greek culture and economic 
dominance within the Ottoman Empire, leading to its gradual subversion from within by a process 
which need to entail a violent clash between the rival Greek and Turkish nations. Thirdly, the idea 
could be interpreted in terms of the modern-nation state, in the Greek Kingdom, which entailed a
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neighbours. However, Greeks in a way to maintain their identity continue to identify 
Turks with the old Ottoman identity that new Turkey had denied. In addition to that, 
the devastating memories, ill-feelings of Turks with regard to what Greeks had done 
against themselves when they occupied the Western Anatolia could not be eliminated 
from their collective identities.
The suppressed hostile collective identities began to surface when the Greek Cypriots 
launched offensive measures against Turkish counterparts and denied their legal 
rights in the 1960’s. When Greek identity called for Enosis—the integration of Greek 
Cypriots with the mainland—Turkey intervened in the island unilaterally in 1974 on 
behalf of the Turkish community justifying its action on the guarantee treaties of 
Zurich and London to which Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom are a part. 
Following this latest encounter the potential problems gained the fertile ground to 
flourish between the two countries. The mutual mistrust, threat and lack of 
confidence have created a socially constructed security dilemma in which the two 
parties negatively identify themselves with each other, and operate on a zero-sum 
logic in which relative gains (as opposed to absolute gains) are concerned the most 
important. In such a structure, economic, legal, political, envkonmental, ethnic—let 
alone military—in brief, all kinds of issues have the potential of becoming a major 
source of tension and of becoming security concerns of both countries. New 
developments—such as technological, legal, environmental—and the issues, which 
were not foreseen in the Lausanne Treaty (the backbone of the balance and the basic 
point of reference between the two countries) can become problematic in such a 
normative structure. In fact, the existing problems are not merely construction or
head-on clash with the Ottoman Empire. Though all these conceptions survived into the twentieth 
century, it was the third which prevailed.” (Bahçeli, 1990; 6).
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misperception. They are real, and have real material bases but they are constructed 
within a social environment.
4.4.2. TURKEY’S STRATEGIC CULTURE IN TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS
Greece, by its claims to extend its territorial waters from six to twelve nautical miles, 
to delimit the Aegean continental shelf through giving continental shelf rights to its 
Aegean islands near- the coast of Turkey, to exercise sovereign rights over all islets, 
rocks in the Aegean constitutes for Turkey a threat to, even violation of, its territorial 
sovereignty. For that matter, when Greece announced that it will extend its territorial 
waters from six to twelve nautical miles, the national assembly of Turkey declared 
that it would be casus belli for Turkey. Simply, Turkey strives for its best to deter 
Greece through its threat to use its armed forces in such a case. To be credible on its 
firm declarations, Turkey always places much more importance on its military 
forces.
Since Turkish military and bureaucracy see the moves of Greece as expansionist, 
Turkey had to take the necessary measures to deter Greece from taking such actions. 
For Turkey, of all national matters, security always has priority in its broadest sense. 
Territorial sovereignty is the most important security issue in interstate relations from 
Turkey’s part in which military takes the lead in every step in the formulation and 
implementation of foreign policies. For an attainment of favourable solution to the 
problems between the two sides, Turkey seeks to exploit all diplomatic means 
including even the threat to use force that is in fact deterrence.
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In the post-Cold war era, for instance, the accession talks of Greek Cypriots to EU, 
Greece’s blockade of financial aid from EU and of Turkey’s full membership to this 
institution, the deployment of S-300 missiles in Southern Cyprus, the identification 
of new islets, rocks in Aegean whose sovereignty is controversial, Greece’s support 
of PKK, and Turkey’s weak human rights record are all matters of contention 
between them.
All those matters are real problems not to be denied but what hinders the parties to 
find workable solutions to them is the conflictual security system that makes them 
enemies. In such a structure, the capabilities of the parties ai'e defined and perceived 
as threats. However, the same capabilities in friendly states (security communities) 
are perceived not as threats but as tools for defence and security.
4.4.3. SECURITY DILEMMA BET'WEEN TURKEY AND GREECE
Turkish-Greek relations since the 1960s operate on the structure of a security 
dilemma. This structure is the result of the practices of the both parties. The friendly 
relations until the 1950s started to deteriorate when Greek Cypriots have pursued a 
policy of enosis (union with Greece) and suppressed and violated the legal rights of 
their Turkish counterparts. Turkey responded by intervening and deploying its 
military forces on the island. These mutual hostile practices and subsequent 
emerging new contentious issues made the nature of relations one of enmity. Enmity 
and friendship are of social, cognitive constructions. States act differently towards 
their friends and enemies. In an enmity structure, the fear of insecurity and
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uncertainty of intentions exacerbate the existing conflictual structure. This, in turn, 
determines or imposes the behavioral patterns upon the parties.
In a standard security dilemma, each state wants to ensure its defense and to diminish
its threat perceptions by increasing its armament. However, as the two parties rely on
their national strength and increase their capabilities for this reason, those
capabilities are perceived as offensive rather than defensive because the social
structure between the sides is conflictual. Weapons, for instance, have no intrinsic
quality, rather they are socially/intersubjectively defined. The cognitive structure
determines what meanings the parties attach to its rival’s capabilities. Thus,
traditional rivals must suffer the burden of past mistrust and present 
conflict. With each convinced of the other’s innate revisionism, 
cooperation will seem like foolish appeasement. Obeying the dictates 
of the deterrence model, each seeks to demonstrate resolve and, 
therefore, refuses to offer the concessions necessary for compromise. 
Cooperation becomes more difficult across the spectrum of contested 
issues, and the spectrum itself widens. (Krebs, 1999:353)
Turkey’s strategic culture is defensive oriented and based on deterxence policy. It
also makes use of its armed forces for deterrence purposes to preserve the status quo
in its relations. Turkey exclusively relies on its own national capabilities in its
relations with Greece. This makes Greece fearful as to Turkey’s actual use of its
capabilities against itself. This strategic culture is best articulated by Turkish veteran
diplomat Şükrü Elekdağ (1996: 33) as such that
the geopolitical realities of the region compel Turkey to increase her 
defense expenditure in order to be able to protect her territorial 
integrity and maintain her security. The threats facing Turkey are so 
diverse and acute that Turkey can only maintain peace by adhering to 
the old adage, ‘Those who want peace, must be prepared for war. ’
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The security dilemma is the result of the mutual practices of the parties. In the 
Turkish-Greek case, the increasing fears and thi’eat perceptions are the effects of such 
practices that ai’e perceived as hostile. In the recent past, three episodes have 
reinforced the structure of enmity between Turkey and Greece: S-300 missiles, 
Kardak (Imia) Crisis and the Ocalan affair. Fkst, as it became known that Greek 
Cypriots ordered S-300 missiles from the Russian Federation, Turkey declared casus 
belli if they are deployed in Greek Cyprus. This is because, these missiles are 
perceived as direct military threats when they are deployed in Baf, an air base in 
Greek Cyprus (Elekdag, 22/09/1997; see for an opposing view Kaynak, 23/01/1997). 
However, for Greek Cypriots they are for defensive purposes and ask why do these 
missiles pose so much threat for Turkey haying a large and strong army (Birand, 
29/09/1997). S-300 crisis became an issue not just of Cyprus but of Turkish-Greek 
relations for threatening the change the strategic balance between the parties in the 
Mediterranean (Kohen, 23/09/1997).
Kardak was a recent issue that led to the parties just to the brink of war unless the 
Americans intervened. The Kardak crisis has discovered another Aegean related 
problem between Turkey and Greece—the issue of the islands and islets whose 
sovereignty is subject to controversy—a ‘grey zone’ in the Aegean. Both parties 
declare their sovereignty over these entities by addressing different texts and sources 
or interpreting them as such to support their theses. In fact, the problem has ‘deep- 
seated historical roots’ relating to the other Aegean problems and the Cyprus issue 
(Papacosma, 1996: 75). The problem is identified as by Turkish President Demirel 
(1998/99: 25) as such “Greece claims over a number of islands, islets, and rocks in 
the Aegean that were never explicitly ceded to it by international treaties. Turkey
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regards this Greek policy as an attempt to establish fait accomplis with a view to
dominating the Aegean Sea as a Greek Lake.” The same view is valid also for
Greece’s attempt to extend its territorial waters from six to twelve nautical miles in
the Aegean Sea. Turkey regards all these acts as provocative, expansionist and
misuse or abuse of legal rights. In turn, Greece sees the determination of Turkey as a
threat with its large armed forces. It is best described by Greek President
Stephanopoulos (1998/99: 21) as such that
The Turkish invasion of Cyprus; the creation of the army of the 
Aegean—the only Turkish formation outside NATO’s integrated 
structure—on the part of Turkey, equipped with the largest fleet of 
landing craft in the Mediterranean; the repeated threat of war and the 
invasion of Greek territory during the Imia crisis, culminating in the 
occupation of one of the Imia islets; constitute a direct threat and give 
Greece the right under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations 
to ensure its inalienable right to legitimate self-defense.
Furthermore, the PKK terrorist organization leader’s affair aggravated the relations 
further as it became known that Ocalan was sheltered by Greek officials when 
Turkey was in hot pursuit for him. As Turkey often warns Greece not to give any 
support to this organization (Cumhuriyet, 18/06/1999; Hürriyet, 23/02/1999). Greece 
responded with heavy accusations against Turkey’s weak human rights record. In 
doing so, it lobbies against Turkey within the European Union, making Turkey’s 
accession to the club and its financial aid to Turkey more difficult.
It is difficult but not impossible to transcendence the social security dilemma 
between the two parties. It, to a great extent, depends on their practices to each other. 
Whenever both Turkey and Greece define themselves and its neighbour in positive 
terms and have a pacific, assuring strategic culture for a certain period of time, then it 
is probable to have a peaceful normative structure between them in which the 
existing problems can be solved more easily.
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CONCLUSION
International Relations Theory in recent past has undergone an important 
transformation. The third debate in its broadest sense—inter-pai'adigm and post­
positivist debates—and the end of the Cold War had significant implications for IR 
theories. The critical approaches of the third debate (Post-structuralism, Post­
modernism, Feminism, and Critical Theory) attacked directly to the underlying 
positivist precepts of mainstream IR theory. They were inward looking, concerned 
primarily with undermining the very foundations of dominant discourses of IR 
Theory. In this respect, they served a valuable purpose of fracturing and destabilizing 
the positivist hegemony, a necessary first step in establishing a new perspective in 
world politics. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War spai’ked renewed interest 
in the search for ideational, normative and cultural explanations for state behaviors in 
the international system, as the failure of mainstream grand theories of IR became 
very much apparent.
Constructivism emerged in this environment and became a viable approach to the 
study of IR. It is an analytical framework or an approach, not a theory of 
international politics. It seems to be eclectic in from, yet synthetic in nature. Eclectic 
because it relies on diverse array of scholarship—structuration theory, post-positivist 
epistemology, intersubjective ontology, social theory of identity a few examples— 
synthetic because it brings them together to form a coherent whole body of 
theoretical assumptions.
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Constructivism is welcomed in that it represents a bridge between the extremes: 
positivist based mainstream theories and radical interpretivist critical theories. While 
the former brand is contested with its positivist underpinnings, neglect of domestic 
and discursive explanations in international politics and its shortcomings to explain 
change, the latter is disputed with its heavy reliance on discursive side of 
international polity and lack of a research program with empirical records. 
Constructivism though draws from both theoretical traditions, yet it is distinct. By 
making use of meta-theoretical insights of critical or reflective international theory, it 
reconceptualizes the basic terms of traditional IR theory, i.e. anarchy, national 
interest, sovereignty, alliance, security dilemma.
It is neither pessimist nor optimist (idealist), objectivist or subjectivist, materialist or 
normative but stands in somewhere between them. It prioritizes and problematizes 
ontology and it defines ontology in intersubjective terms. It challenges both the 
materialist and rationalist precepts of neorealism and neoliberalism respectively. 
That makes constructivism to address the neglected issues and question the taken- 
for-granted assumptions in IR. However, in epistemological terms, it holds the 
middle ground. Furthermore, it does not adhere to particular methodology, but rather 
it makes use of both positivist and interpretivist methodologies and various research 
techniques, qualitative or quantitative, generalizing or particularizing. Initially 
developed as a meta-theoretical project and lacks a well-established theory of its 
own, constructivism developed its own basic assumptions and conceptual frames and 
thus produced numerous empirical works. Constructivism thus avoids the pitfalls of 
both mainstream and critical theories and suggests an alternative approach to the
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study of IR by providing a research program. All of these qualities make 
constructivism a viable approach in IR Theory.
This study intended to establish a constructivist foreign and security studies with a 
view to identity and culture. It explored how identity and culture shape not only the 
state actions but also its preferences or interests. The distinct aspect of constructivist 
foreign policy analysis from other ideational and cognitive approaches is its 
conceptualization of identity and culture as both constitutive of interests not just 
behavioral and as collective phenomena instead of individual. Therefore, 
constructivism argues that the effects of identity and culture go deeper. They 
constitute the content of ‘national interest’, the sources of ‘threat perceptions’ and the 
ideational bases of military strategies.
Constructivism accept that national interests, threat perceptions, security dilemmas 
are important determining factors for state foreign and security policies. However, it 
contends that they are socially constructed with a view to identity and culture. That 
is, they are not defined through distribution of power, but distribution of knowledge. 
The processes of interest formation and threat construction are not independent of 
identity formation and cultural factors. At a deeper level of foreign and security 
preferences and actions lie ideational factors. Therefore, it is meaningless to portray 
a foreign policy outcome developed out of a peculiar identity and culture of an actor 
as the one against the national interests. Constructivism holds that both realpolitik 
and idealpolitik can be social constructions upon certain structures of identities and 
cultures. It does not necessarily challenge with realism or idealism.
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Turkish foreign policy is much bounded with identity questions and strategic culture. 
Turkey’s western oriented foreign and security policy can be explained with 
reference to the identity that is attributed to the Turkish Republic—western, national, 
secular and civilized. The strategic choice of aligning with the Western world is not 
just a consequence of Soviet threat but also Turkey’s western identity. The same can 
be said for Turkey’s lust for European Union full membership. The domestic and 
international developments sometimes can change the configuration of this well- 
established identity, then Turkey seek to diversify its foreign and security policies. 
However, the basic pillars of this identity in general remain the same and thus the 
alternative options of Turkey is regarded as instrumental or complementary not 
challenges to Turkey’s western oriented foreign and security policy. Turkish-Israeli 
relations can be seen as an extension and reflection of Turkey’s western oriented 
foreign policy in the Middle East. Turkish-Greek relations develop in line with their 
mutual· but exclusive, negative national identity formation. This is because Greece 
defines Turkey not in western, secular and civilized terms but the contrary.
The strategic culture of Turkey is defensive realpolitik. It is also related with its 
identity defined in terms of territoriality and constitutional rights. Thus, Turkey has 
special importance to protect its territories and constitutional order against internal 
and external threats. As Turkey’s domestic institutional structure and political culture 
makes the military as the most determining one in foreign and security policies, the 
organizational culture of military shape the strategic culture. The military thinks in 
terms of geopolitics, and places much importance to the threat to use of armed 
forces. For defensive purposes, it enters into bilateral and multilateral alliances or 
rehes on its national resources. The strategic alignment with Israel can be a reflection
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of Turkey’s balancing policy against potential thi'eats through an alliance with a 
reference to geopolitical realities of the region. Turkey in its relations with Greece 
basically depends on its own national resources and follows a policy of deterrence 
for peace. Within the conflictual normative structure between the parties, the mutual 
security practices of both countries are constructed as threats and further perpetuate 
the existing structure of enmity.
Consequently, the identity and threat constructions shape the state preferences and 
actions as one of either alliance—a form of security community—in the case of 
Turkey and Israel or security dilemma in the case of Turkey and Greece. However, 
these are social constructions depending on various factors but most important on 
mutual practices.
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